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1. Executive Summary 
 
Super Typhoon Haiyan, called Yolanda in the Philippines, devastated the Eastern Visayas and part of the Central 
Visayas on November, 8, 2013. Haiyan caused over 7,000 casualties, displaced over 4 million people, and damaged 
or destroyed over 1 million houses due to remarkably high wind speed, storm surge and large waves. 
The International Research Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS), at Tohoku University in Sendai, Japan 
dispatched several investigating teams from December, 2013 through March, 2014 to gather information from 
governmental, hospital and research organizations in Manila. In addition, the teams assessed damage in several 
areas on Leyte and Samar islands with local counterparts. The name of the mission was the “IRIDeS fact-finding 
mission,” and the IRIDeS survey team consisted of 4 teams; 1) Hazard and Damage Evaluation team, 2) Warning 
and Evacuation Assessment team, 3) Disaster Medical Science team, and 4) Disaster Recovery team. 
 
The Hazard and Damage Evaluation team first conducted the damage interpretation using satellite images in 
order to identify severly damaged areas and to provide important information to focus the activities for the on-site 
field survey (Chapter 3). This kind of rapid damage assessment can contribute actively to emergency response and 
relief effort allocation and management when disasters impact a large area. In addition, a numerical simulation of 
the storm surge and large waves using Delft-3D and SWAN with a parametric hurricane model was promptly 
conducted for Leyte and Samar Islands in order to understand the magnitude and features of surges and waves 
induced by Haiyan (Chapter 4). From the simulation results, it was found that the water levels were dominated by 
wind-driven storm surge near Tacloban and by waves in eastern Samar. 
During the on-site survey in Leyte and Eastern Samar on January 16 – 24, 2014 (Chapter 5), inundation heights 
of storm surges and large waves were measured, and a detailed inundation map in Tacloban was developed, mainly 
based on local interviews with eyewitnesses. For example, storm surge heights up to 6 m were measured near the 
shoreline in Tacloban and wave runup of up to 12 m were measured in Eastern Samar. In addition, typical damage 
to houses and seawalls by strong wind, storm surge and high waves in Leyte and Eastern Samar were investigated 
throughout the survey. Based upon the initial analysis and on-site survey, several problems and recommendations 
are presented in this report. Data analysis and numerical simulations are still ongoing. 
 
The Warning and Evacuation Assessment team aimed at examining and recording evacuation behavior and 
information notification in the area affected by Haiyan. A questionnaire survey in Tacloban city and Palo and 
Tanauan municipalities on Leyte Island was implemented from March 14, 2014 to March 22, 2014 and in total 642 
samples were taken. The survey shows that the ratio of evacuation away from home was about 70%. Patterns of 
evacuation behavior differ with location, gender and age. Although all survey sites are located in the same coastal 
area, preliminary analysis shows that reasons and clues for evacuation are different at each site. 
 
The Disaster medical science team investigated the immediate medical and public health response, domestic and 
international medical aid, outbreak of infectious diseases, psychosocial problems and mental health of the affected 
people in collaboration with medical and public health researchers in the Philippines, WHO, the Department of 
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Health and others to promote collaborative research and publicizing of the results. According to the geographical 
mapping of the possible hospitals and health related facilities in the affected area, individual visits to health 
facilities and interviews were very effective for understanding the structural, non-structural and functional damage 
of health related facilities. They observed the sanitary and health condition of the affected people and also visited 
international humanitarian assistance agencies. They established and extended the collaborative relationships 
between IRIDeS and San Lazaro Hospital, DOH, WHO and WPRO, Univ. Philippines Manila and Angeles Univ. to 
exchange information and knowledge about disaster medicine and public health. They shared their experience of 
the Great East Japan Earthquake and made recommendations at DOH in a technical discussion to establish safe 
hospitals as a building last standing in a disaster. 
 
Research on post-disaster recovery needs to track several areas affected by the typhoon in the Philippines for a 
long time. The Disaster Recovery team organized three groups according to timing of surveys and topics. The first 
group was in charge of data acquisition necessary to understand the social context of the Philippines, to study 
long-term recovery phenomena, and to obtain basic information. They obtained statistic data, maps and geospatial 
data from the Government for IRIDeS’s study. They also conducted field surveys, including building damage 
records and interviews of affected people and local governments, in Daanbantayan in Cebu, and in Basey on Samar 
Island. Although some analysis of building damage is in progress, several regional specific problems facing 
recovery were clarified by the surveys. 
 
The second group conducted a collaborative field survey between UCL-IRDR and Tohoku University-IRIDeS 
four months after the typhoon. Interviews and accompanying structural engineering surveys of the respondents’ 
dwellings were conducted for 160 households in 12 coastal barangays. Regarding evacuation, the system of using 
barangay leaders to disseminate warnings appeared successful in terms of reaching people, although in many cases 
the severity of the storm surge was underestimated. Almost all interviewees knew about the 40m no-build zones, 
but this policy does not reflect variations in hazard associated with variable coastline topography. Those within 
these zones seemed to have little idea about relocation plans while most households outside these zones wanted to 
stay in place. It appears that cash distributions from an NGO, despite likely causing price inflation, were useful in 
allowing the purchase of reconstruction materials. Property insurance is sparse in the Philippines and the surveys 
highlighted the lack of awareness about it. More than half of the temporary shelters examined were built without 
the aid of professional advice or help leading to people living in precarious, makeshift conditions. Therefore, 
training programs are needed in the early stages of the transitional phase of recovery to ensure lower vulnerability 
to future natural disasters. 
 
The third group emphasized to investigate community resilience, to a lesser extent, issues on post-disaster 
planning and policies, as well as roles that NGOs and private firms have played. The group held various interviews 
with national and local government officers, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), the private sector, community 
(Barangay) leaders, and local residents, in the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc, where the major causes of devastation 
were storm surge and strong wind, respectively. Intervies were also held in Manila. Key findings from 
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reconnaissance include: i) Land use along the seashore has been seriously discussed after typhoon Haiyan, and 
local governments are planning land use measures to reduce risk, including relocation of communities. Yet, the 
opportunity to achieve this goal is decreasing as time proceeds; ii) an innovative disaster management act named 
“the Philippines Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010” has not yet nurtured the disaster 
management capacity of local governments in practice. However, the role of Philippines-based stakeholders, 
including national and local CSOs as well as the private sector, has been important in disaster response and 
mitigation; and iii) Barangays, as the smallest administrative body, have sufficient ability to respond to and recover 
from smaller disasters. However, the impact and the scale of typhoon Haiyan were overwhelming to infrastructure, 
and as a result, local communities were devestated. 
 
 
  The results of these fact finding surveys are presented in this report. Priority proposed activities for investigating 
the disaster caused by Typhoon Haiyan are listed below. 
 
1. A rapid response Task Force Team is formed within IRIDeS 
 
2. The Task Force Team will consider conducting the following activities: 
 
1) Setting clear objectives and deliverables of the Task Force Team and giving assignments to each Division 
Chief and volunteer 
2) Gathering information on the identified subjects and setting up a website to share information within IRIDeS 
and beyond 
3) Dispatching research missions to the affected area to gather on-site information for better analysis and provide 
useful guidance to the authorities and communities 
4) Publishing IRIDeS reports based on the findings of the Task Force 
5) Sharing lessons learnt from the disaster in an international symposium 
 
3. Proposed subjects to be pursued and confirmed by IRIDeS researchers are as follows: 
 
1) Hazard perspective: investigation of storm surge, flooding, landslides, and wind. 
2) Structural and engineering perspective: survey of buildings damaged by storm surge and strong wind 
3) Non-structural measures: early warning system, public awareness and education. 
4) Social, human and behavioral perspective: impacts on socially vulnerable communities including illegal 
settlements, gender and other social issues, review of evacuation and shelter options, management of shelters. 
5) Environmental perspective: land use. 
6) Public health and medical perspective: epidemiological survey of victims, management of transmittable 
diseases, mid-term to long-term medical assistance, psychological impacts. 





4.   Interaction with exchange students from the Philippines  
 




































2. Summary of Typhoon Haiyan 
 
A powerful tropical cyclone, named as Typhoon Haiyan, struck some areas of Southeast Asian countries. The 
Philippines was one of the most affected regions due to high winds and storm surges. Thousands of people are 
feared dead or missing after Typhoon Haiyan swept across the central Philippines on November 8, 2013. The 
details of Haiyan are described below. 
 
2.1 Track of Typhoon Haiyan 
 
According to the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), at 4:40 am on 
November 8, 2013 at Philippine time, Haiyan made its first landfall over Guiuan, Eastern Samar with the maximum 
wind speed of 125 kt and central pressure of 895 hPa (Category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale). Haiyan 
kept the same maximum wind speed and made the 2nd landfall over Tolosa, Leyte at 7:00 am and its 3rd landfall 
over Daanbantayan, Cebu at about 9:40 am. At 10:40 am, Haiyan made its 4th landfall over Bantayan Island, Cebu 
and by 12:00 its 5th landfall over Concepcion, Iloilo. In the afternoon, it maintained its strength as it approached 
the Calamian Group of Islands, and it made its 6th landfall over Busuanga, Palawan at 8:00 pm. Haiyan weakened 
as it continued to traverse over the West Philippines Sea. Fig. 2-1 shows the track of Haiyan at the Philippines local 
time: UTC + 8 hrs (Unisys Weather, 2013). Fig. 2-2 shows the track of Haiyan in a large domain with the time 
series of the central pressure (NII, 2013). A rapid decrease of the central pressure of Haiyan can be seen from Fig. 
2-2. 
 
Fig. 2-1. Track of Haiyan shown by white line and red circles (Google earth). The time indicating along the track is 





Fig. 2-2. Track of Haiyan (left) and time series of the central pressure of Haiyan (right), UTC (National Institute of 
Informatics [NII], Digital Typhoon: Typhoon 201330 [Haiyan]). 
 
 
2.2 Ground observations 
 
Fig. 2-3 shows the time series of the observed wind speed and mean sea level pressure at Tacloban weather station 
in Leyte and Guiuan station in Eastern Samar. The data was provided by the Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical 
and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA). The rainfall data is also measured at Tacloban station. The 
landfall time is around 8:00 am in Tacloban and 5:00 am in Guiuan on November 8. A rapid increase of wind speed 
and rainfall and a decrease of mean sea level pressure toward the peak landfall time can be clearly seen from Fig. 
2-3. It should be emphasized that the observation equipment was totally destroyed due to the high wind and/or 
storm surge inundation and data recordings stopped around the peak time, so that the observation may have missed 
the peak values of the wind speed and pressure. These incidents prove that the wind speed on the ground and storm 
surge were enormously strong during the Haiyan event. 
   Fig. 2-4 shows the time series of the predicted astronomical tide at Tacloban and Guiuan. The data was also 
provided by PAGASA. The tide levels are based on the average mean sea level. It is noted that the tide level data at 
Tacloban in Fig. 2-4 is based on the linear interpolation of the predicted peak tide level data. It can be seen from the 
figure that the tide level was not so high during the landfall of Haiyan. If the landfall had occurred during the high 
tide, the damage by storm surges and high waves would have been more serious. 
   Fig. 2-5 shows 24-hr rainfall depth during the Haiyan event (13:00, Nov. 6 – 12:00, Nov. 9, UTC) over the 
Philippines obtained from GSMaP data (JAXA). GSMaP (e.g. Kubota et al., 2007) developed by JAXA is based on 
satellite-derived rainfall data. From this figure relatively high 24-rainfall more than 150 mm was observed in 
several regions during the Haiyan event. These heavy rainfalls may have caused flooding in rivers and landslides in 
the mountainous regions. However, it should be noted that satellite-driven rainfall data provided by GSMaP may 




Fig. 2-3. Time series of wind speed and mean sea level pressure at Tacloban station in Leyte Island and Guiuan 
station in Eastern Samar from 0:00 on November 7 through 8:00 am on November 8. 
 
Fig. 2-4. Time series of the predicted astronomical tide level at Tacloban and Guiuan from 0:00 on November 7 
through 8:00 am on November 8. 
 
13:00, 11/6 – 12:00 11/7 (UTC)    13:00, 11/7 – 12:00, 11/8 (UTC)   13:00, 11/8 – 12:00, 11/9 (UTC) 






































































































































































2.3 Summary of Damage 
 
Haiyan caused massive damages in Philippines. As of 6:00 am on March 14, 2014, 6,268 individuals were reported 
dead, 28,689 injured and 1,061 are still missing. A total of 3,424,593 families (16,078,181 persons) were affected in 
12,139 barangays in 44 provinces, 591 municipalities and 57 cities of Regions IV-A, IV-B, V, VI, VII, VIII, X, XI, 
and Caraga in Philippines. The number of damaged houses was 1,140,332 (550,928 totally and 589,404 partially). 
The total cost of damage is PHP 39,821,497,852.17 with PHP 19,559,379,136.11 for infrastructures and PHP 
20,262,118,716.06 for agriculture in Regions IV-A, IV-B,V,VI, VII, VIII, and CARASA (NDRRMC, 2014).  
Especially, human casualties in Tacloban city and Palo and Tanauan municipalities of Leyte were very high. 
The locations of those places and DEM of Leyte and Samar are shown in Fig. 2-6. The number of deaths and 
missing people are 2,603 in Tacloban, 1,101 in Palo and 859 in Tanauan (as of February 25, 2014) according to the 
information provided by each municipality. It means that more than 60 % of human casualties from Haiyan were 
concentrated in those 3 cities in Leyte. Fig. 2-7 shows the population, the number of deaths and missing people due 
to Haiyan and fatality ratio [%] in each barangay in Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan of Northern Leyte Island (Kure et 
al., 2014). A barangay is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines. Barangays with more than 10 % of 
the fatality ratio can be found along the coastal zones in three cities, and the damage clearly indicates the massive 
external force of the storm surge during the Haiyan event and the vulnerability of those coastal areas. 
 
 




Fig. 2-7. Population (left), number of deaths and missing people (middle) due to Haiyan and fatality ratio [%] 
(right) in each barangay of Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan (Kure et al., 2014). 
 
2.4 Evacuation Warning 
 
Warning Record 
A tropical storm spotted over the Caroline island in the Pacific Ocean on November 4 and it was named as 
Haiyan at 8:00 am at the Philippines local time. PAGASA officially announced the Weather Advisory #1 as 
the warning of Haiyan at 11:00 am on November 5. The Joint Typhoon Warning Center (JTWC) assessed the 
system as a Category 5 super typhoon on the Saffir-Simpson hurricane wind scale on November 6. 
Accordingly PAGASA upgraded the warning to the Sever Weather Bulletin #1 at 11:00 am on November 6. 
The Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) estimated the system’s one-minute sustained winds to 315 km/h and 
gusts up to 378 km/h at 3:00 am on November 7. At 11:00 am, PAGASA announced the Sever Weather 
Bulletin #3, warning that the storm surges might reach up to a 7-meter wave height in the coastal areas of 
Eastern Samar, Samar, Leyte and Southern Leyte in Visayas. Then, as explained in Section 2.1, Haiyan made 
its first landfall over Guiuan, Eastern Samar with the peak intensity at 4:40 am on November 8. President Aquino 
declared the state of “National Disaster” from the damage of Haiyan on November 11.  
It should be emphasized that PAGASA estimated and warned the 7-meter wave height in the coastal areas with 
the leading time of about 18 hours before the first landfall in Guinuan. This estimation was based on the numerical 
simulations technically supported by the JMA and historical records of the waves that PAGASA has. It was found 
from the survey after the Haiyan event that the estimation of 7 m wave height of PAGASA was appropriate, and the 




Disaster Information Transfer System 
A disaster information transfer system in Philippines is shown in Fig. 2-8 (Miyamoto et al. 2014). The figure was 
provided by Dr. Mamoru Miyamoto (International Centre for Water Hazard and Risk Management [ICHARM]). 
Disaster information from PAGASA is transferred to the NDRRMC, National Media, and the public departments 
concerned such as the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). The NDRRMC transfers the 
information to the Barangay through the Regional, Provincial and Municipality Disaster Risk Reduction 
Management Councils (DRRMC). Then, the disaster information is conveyed to a house to a house in local 
barangays. As explained in the previous section, PAGASA warned the 7-meter wave height in the coastal areas 
before the landfall. Thus, it is important to assess whether this information transfer system worked well or not 
during the Haiyan event and how long it took for the houses to receive this disaster information. 
 
 
Fig. 2-8. Disaster information transfer system in Philippines (Miyamoto et al., 2014). 
 
Problems for Evacuation 
Several problems related to the evacuation to prepare for Haiyan were found through the on-site survey and local 
interviews by the IRIDeS team, as discussed in later chapters. Main problems were lack of education, poverty and 
inappropriate evacuation facilities. It is a famous story that many people did not understand what a storm surge is. 
During the local interview by the IRIDeS team, many people claimed that they did not understand the meaning of 
the storm surge that was used in the evacuation warning from PAGASA and local DRRMCs. They also claimed that 
if the warning had been made by using the word “tsunami,” they would have evacuated. This incident clearly 
indicates the importance of disaster education. 
Another problem is the poverty. Young strong men had to stay in their houses during the Haiyan event in order 
to protect their properties from being stolen by somebody during the evacuation. This kind of social problem 
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should be seriously considered by the government, and some kind of insurance system or a guarantee system from 
the government should be discussed. 
It is also a famous story of Haiyan that the evacuation facilities were not appropriate against the storm surges 
and enormously strong wind. For example, the Tacloban City Convention Center in Tacloban is located near the 
coastline as shown in Fig. 2-9 (left). About a thousand people evacuated to the center, and the center was inundated 
by the storm surge induced by Haiyan. Again, this incident shows the importance of disaster education. Another 
example is the Leyte Convention Center located in Palo. About 400 people evacuated to this center but this center 
was completely destroyed by the strong wind as shown in Fig. 2-9 (right). It was very fortunate that nobody died 
from Haiyan in those centers because people who evacuated to the Tacloban City Convention Center could escape 
upstairs after the center began to be inundated by the storm surge, and those who went to the Leyte Convention 
Center could evacuate to another facility before it collapsed. We confirmed this with local offices. For future 
typhoons, evacuation facilities should be evaluated and selected considering their strength and appropriateness. 
However, the population of Tacloban is more than 200,000, so that it is not easy for the government to provide 
appropriate evacuation facilities for all the people living in Tacloban. 
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3. Initial damage mapping by satellite images 
 
3.1 Rapid Damage Assessment 
 
Introduction 
After the impact of Super Typhoon Haiyan to the coast of Tacloban city, a set of satellite images was obtained to 
grasp the extension of the damage using visual interpretation of pre- and post-event satellite optical images. 
Satellite imagery has been used to assess the extent and level of damage in areas with limited access and on need 
for support and quick emergency response (Wegscheider et al., 2013). 
Manual visual interpretation method was used following the first steps described on the methodology to 
develop tsunami fragility functions (Koshimura et al., 2009; Suppasri et al., 2011; Mas et al., 2012). It is one of the 
most accurate methods when using very-high-resolution (VHR) imagery (Wegscheider et al., 2013). 
 
Satellite Image Data 
The pre-event data used for the damage interpretation was obtained directly from Google Earth, retrieved by 
November 8, 2013; while the post-event image was acquired on November 13, 2013 through Digital Globe in 
Google Earth. A zoom into the Anibong area in Tacloban city is shown in Fig.3-1.  
 
Methodology 
For the visual inspection we classified the damage interpretation into two levels according to the following criteria: 
 
a. High damage or destruction. Here, roofs that had been reduced by more than 50% between pre- and post-event 
images are included together with structures that had been washed or blown away. 
 
b. Low damage or survival. These are structures where only a small variation on its geometry or roof shape could 
be observed.  Structures in areas near the coastline where flood was expected are also considered into this 
classification of low damage and survival. 
 
Results and discussion 
Fig.3-2 shows the area of Tacloban city and the damage interpretation resulted in this area. As shown in the figure, 
the areas to the north and the south near to the coastline presented high damage, while the center of Tacloban, the 
downtown area was less damaged by the winds or surges in comparison. 
Following the remote sensing approach, the field survey observations confirmed qualitatively the damage in 
these areas (Mas, E. et al., 2014). Reasons for the distribution of such damage in the areas were confirmed during 
the field survey and can be summarize as follows: 
 
a. The structures to the north and to the south of downtown Tacloban city were built based on lightweight material 
and very near to the shoreline. Thus, high vulnerability to wind and storm surge was confirmed. Structures in 
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downtown Tacloban are mainly of concrete frame buildings and brick walls with corrugated galvanized iron 
sheets for houses with one or two stories. 
 
b. The topography of downtown Tacloban is higher at some points compared to its northern and southern areas. In 
addition, to the north, in the Anibong area, following the low-lying flat area a immediate steep slope could be 
observed. This slope might have caused refraction of waves and wind damaging and triggering slope failures. 
 
c. At the Anibong area, ships were found stranded inland. The storm surges carrying these ships inland caused more 
damage to the urban settlements. 
 
Conclusion 
The damage interpretation using satellite images provided important information to grasp the damage in the areas 
and, in our field survey team case, focus the activities for our field survey. A rapid damage assessment such as the 
one developed here can contribute actively to the emergency response and relief effort allocation and management 
when disasters impact on wide areas. 
 
 
Fig. 3-1. Close view of the Anibong area in Tacloban city from pre- and post-event satellite images used on the 





Fig.3-2. Result of the visual damage assessment using pre- and post-event satellite images of Tacloban city. 
 
 
3.2 Rapid Inundation Mapping 
 
Introduction 
In response to the Super Typhoon Haiyan event, a rapid inundation mapping was conducted (Adriano, B. et al., 
2014). Here, visible near-infrared (VNIR) imagery from the Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and 
Reflection Radiometer (ASTER) sensor was used to infer the extent of the possible flooded areas. Using the 
Normalized Difference Water Index (NDWI), the presence of water features can be enhanced and then observed as 
a result of image processing. 
 
Satellite Image Data 
ASTER data was used, where the pre-event VNIR image was taken on June 1, 2008 and the post-event VNIR 
image was taken on November 15, 2013.  
 
Methodology 
The index analysis of ASTER’s VNIR images using NDWI was performed using ArcGIS software. To enhance the 
water features and discover wetland areas, the following equation is applied during image processing: 
NDWI = (Green – NIR)/(Green + NIR) 
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Where “Green” refers to the green band from the color band spectrum of the VNIR image; and “NIR” stands for the 
near-infra red band of the VNIR image. 
The equation is applied to both, the pre- and the post-event, images and finally the difference of post- minus 
pre-event image is applied to obtain the new wetland areas presenting the post-event image condition, as shown in 
blue in Fig.3-3. 
 
Results and discussion 
The blue areas presented in Fig.3-3 correspond to areas with high probability of presence of water. A preliminary 
estimation of flooded areas by the typhoon was observed from the shoreline to the inland following the blue 
colored areas. However, field survey observations and measurements were needed to differentiate the cause of the 
flood, either by storm surge, rainfall or river. 
 
Conclusion 
A rapid assessment of possible inundated areas form the storm surges in Super Typhoon Haiyan event was 
conducted using satellite imagery. The NDWI analysis of pre- and post-event images provided a preliminary 
estimation of areas possibly flooded and where damage could occur. Field survey was necessary to confirm the 
origin and intensity of the flood at each location. 
 
Fig.3-3. Result of the NDWI analysis of pre- and post-event satellite images. The blue areas represent areas which 
experienced flooding. Areas where storm surge was responsible for the flooding can be inferred by connectivity 
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The behavior of Typhoon Haiyan was hindcast using typhoon track data from the Japan Meteorological Agency 
(2013), which was input into a parametric hurricane model (Holland, 1980) for air-pressure field estimation, 
followed by the moving-typhoon model of Fujii & Mitsuda (1986) as described in Veltcheva & Kawaii (2002) for 
estimation of the wind field. The typhoon track data included data on location of the center of the storm, 
surface-level air pressure at the storm center, and maximum sustained wind speed. However, it did not contain 
information on the radius to maximum winds, so a radius to maximum winds of 25 km is assumed (Quiring, 2011).  
The hindcast pressure and wind fields are input into a combined hydrodynamic and wave model to hindcast the 
water level and wave heights induced by the typhoon. The hydrodynamic model used is Delft-3D (Deltares, 2011), 
and the spectral wave model used is SWAN (Booij et al., 1999). Delft-3D and SWAN are run together, with the 
hydrodynamic model repeatedly passing water level and current fields to the wave model, which calculates the 
wave field including the effects of currents and storm surge. The wave model in turn passes the radiation stress 
field back to the hydrodynamic model, which uses this information to calculate wave-induced setup and nearshore 
currents. Tides are included using the Global Tide database TPXO (2014) as a boundary condition to the 
hydrodynamic model.  
Rough bathymetry was taken from GEBCO (2014) and topography from SRTM (NASA, 2014). Detailed 
bathymetry of Leyte Gulf was digitized from a nautical chart (NAMRIA, 1980) by Associate Prof. Hiroshi Takagi 
of the Tokyo Institute of Technology, and topography of downtown Tacloban and Tacloban Airport were surveyed 
during the January 2014 IRIDeS site visit. Nearshore coral reef topography east of Samar is not available, so the 
horizontal extents of reefs were digitized from Google Earth images, and a depth of 1 m relative to mean sea level 
was assumed. Model resolution is 2.5 km for the large domain (Fig.4-1), 100 m for the Tacloban domain (Fig.4-2), 
and 50 m for the Guiuan (Fig.4-3) and Hernani (Fig.4-4) domains. Manning’s n was assumed to be 0.025 
everywhere, though for more detailed inundation analysis in the future, this will need to be adjusted for land use. 
 
4.2 Results and Discussion 
 
The water levels shown in Fig.4-1 were dominated by wind-driven storm surge near Tacloban and waves in eastern 
Samar. Fig.4-1 (right) shows maximum (in time) hindcast significant wave heights during the storm, reaching up to 
20 m off Eastern Samar, and decreasing to less than 5 m in Leyte Gulf near Tacloban. Fig.4-2 shows the storm 
surge (wind-dominated) near Tacloban, including inundation of downtown Tacloban and Tacloban Airport. The 5-m 
surge extends up the San Juanico Strait to Bogulibas, then rapidly dissipates where the strait narrows. Damage 
along Tacloban’s shoreline (Fig.4-2c) indicated waves atop the surge (Fig.4-2b) were strong enough to wreck RC 
structures, and to cause erosion near building foundations. Inland from the shoreline (Fig.4-2d), damage resembled 
that of a slow, deep flood. In Eastern Samar (Fig.4-3 and 4-4), wind- and pressure-driven storm surges were small 
(Fig.4-3a and 4-4a), but wave-induced setup over the broad coral reefs in these areas generated a surge up to 5 m 
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high (Fig.4-3b and 4-4b). Waves on top of this wave setup (Fig.4-3c and 4-4c) wrecked structures (Fig.4-3d and 
4-4d) and transported concrete and coral debris up to 50 m inland. 
An important item that this surge and wave modeling has not resolved, however, is the tsunami-like behavior of 
the flood captured on film in Hernani by a member of the NGO Plan Philippines International. Monserrat et al. 
(2006) describe mateo-tsunamis, which are bore-like seiches that can cause destruction similar to that of a tsunami. 
If the present phenomenon is indeed a meteo-tsunami generated by the travelling low-pressure system (the 
typhoon), the Delft3D shallow water model should be able to reproduce it, and the lack of this effect in the model 
result indicates that either the local topography/bathymetry data is insufficient, or the hurricane model is not 
sufficiently resolving the pressure field. Alternately, if the bore is related to wave phenomena (infragravity waves 
such as surf beat, for instance), the phase-averaged SWAN wave model would not resolve this physics; in this case, 




Fig.4-1. (left) Maximum water level (including both surge and waves) measured by the IRIDeS survey team 
(Chapter 5.2 and Mas et al., 2014). (right) Maximum significant wave height hindcast by SWAN. Note the jagged 




Fig.4-2. (a) Maximum storm surge for small domain (1) of Fig.4-1. (b) Maximum significant wave height. (c) 



























Fig.4-3. (a) Maximum storm surge neglecting wave setup for domain (2) of Fig.4-1. (b) Maximum storm surge 




Fig.4-4. (a) Maximum storm surge neglecting wave setup for domain (3) of Fig.4-1. (b) Maximum storm surge 
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5. IRIDeS fact-finding mission, Hazard and Damage Evaluation Team 
 
5.1 Missions and local collaborators 
 
IRIDeS sent the Hazard and Damage Evaluation Team to conduct an on-site field survey to collect general 
information including evacuation response, inundation time and depth, emergency response by local government, 
etc. and obtain spatial data, statistical data and documents related to the damage caused by Typhoon Haiyan. And 
discussed with local authorities about possible collaborations to mitigate typhoon-related disasters in the future.  
 
Name of the mission 
IRIDeS Fact-finding mission to Philippines (2nd mission, January 16 - 24, 2014) 
 
Hazard and Damage Evaluation team 
1.  Ass. Prof. Shuichi Kure (Team Leader, Disaster Potential Study) 
2.  Assoc. Prof. Jeremy D. Bricker (Technology for Global Disaster Risk)  
3.  Ass. Prof. Erick Mas (Remote Sensing and Geoinformatics for Disaster Management) 
4.  Ass. Prof. Carine J. YI (International Strategy for Disaster Mitigation) 
5.  Mr. Bruno Adriano (Remote Sensing and Geoinformatics for Disaster Management) 
 
Philippines counterparts 
1.  Dr. Maritess S. Quimpo (Bureau of Research and Standards, DPWH) 
2.  Prof. Cristopher Stonewall P Espina (College of Architecture, UP) 
3.  Mr. Karl Taberdo (College of Architecture, UP) 
4.  Mr. Paul Tupaz (BS Economics Student, UP) 
5.  Mr. Christer Kim Gerona (BS Political Science Student, UP) 
 
Tasks of the Hazard and Damage Evaluation team, IRIDeS 
 
Target Area:  
1) The city of Tacloban, Municipality of Palo, Municipality of Tanauan, and rural areas around rivers and  
mountains on Leyte Island 
2) Coastal areas on Eastern Samar Island 
 
Task 1. Verification of satellite image analysis using ground truth data and understanding the damage characteristics 
of buildings due to typhoons: 
 
 Measurement of inundation levels 
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 Classification of buildings damaged by storm surge and strong wind 
 Taking of photos with GPS information of damaged places and buildings 
 
Task 2. Data measurement and collection for detailed storm surge and wave modeling: 
 
 Measurement and/or collection of bathymetry data of Tacloban Bay and the straight that connects Tacloban 
Bay to Carigara Bay 
 Collection of fine-resolution topographic data of Tacloban city and other areas that experienced significant 
inundation and storm surge damage 
 Cataloging of coastal defenses (seawalls, levees, gates, if any) that existed before the storm, as well as their 
condition after the storm 
 
Task 3. Investigation of other hazards (flooding, landslides, wave intrusion along the river, etc.) induced by Haiyan: 
 
 Collection of hazard maps and hydro-meteorological data such as wind speed, rainfall, river discharge, tide 
level data, etc. 
 Travel around rivers and mountainous regions to identify flooding and landslide damage induced by the 
typhoon 
 Modeling of the flood due to heavy rainfall with high tide level induced by the typhoon. 
 
 
5.2 Inundation map 
 
The main objectives of the mission were to collect spatial data, statistic data and documents and measure the 
inundation heights from storm surge and waves to inspect the damage and magnitude of Haiyan, and to conduct and 
verify the numerical simulation and satellite image analysis results. In order to make an inundation map of Haiyan, 
we conducted an on-site survey in Tacloban city and towns on Leyte and Samar Islands. 
  The survey was mainly conducted based on local interviews to obtain inundation heights and reliable information 
because it was difficult to find clear water marks of the storm surge and high wave inundation due to heavy rainfall 
during the Haiyan event and severe building damage induced by the strong wind. On the other hand, many 
residents around the coast stayed in their houses until inundation occurred, and witnessed the flooding event. 
Measurements were conducted using a portable laser rangefinder referenced to sea water level at the time of the 
survey. Examples scenes from the survey are shown in Fig.5-1. 
Fig.5-2 shows the area of the city of Tacloban where the most of survey point data was taken by the team. The 
bottom left inset shows the inundation heights measured in downtown Tacloban. In the right inset an estimated 
inundation limit was drawn as a result of the Normalized Difference Water Index (NDWI) analysis explained in 
Chapter 3 of this report; the measurements were available from the field survey and interviews with eyewitnesses 
and residents in Tacloban (Adriano et al., 2014; Mas et al., 2014). The Storm surge height was measured as high as 
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6m near the shoreline. The survivors reported waves up to 4 m high atop the surge. Wave runup up to 12 m high 
was observed in Eastern Samar (Mas et al., 2014; Bricker et al., 2014). For more details, please see Bricker et al. 
(2014), Mas et al. (2014) and Kure et al. (2014). Also, the JSCE-PICE1 joint survey team reported detailed 




Fig.5-1. Pictures of the inundation survey in Leyte and Samar. 
                                                  





Fig.5-2. Measured inundation heights in Tacloban city based on survivors’ interviews (left) and inundated area 
estimated from NDWI analysis (right) [explained in Chapter 3]. 
 
5.3 Northern extent of surge 
 
The storm surge simulation hindcast a steep change in maximum surge elevation about 15 km north of downtown 
Tacloban, where the San Juanico Strait narrows and curves before widening again near Santa Rita to the north. 
Fig.5-3 shows the result of the storm surge simulation near Tacloban. Between Tacloban Airport and Bogulibas, 
maximum storm surge height was about 5 m above Mean Sea Level. North of Bogulibas, storm surge elevation 
rapidly diminished to less than 1 m. In Santa Rita, the modeled storm surge elevation was less than 1 m, and during 
our team’s field survey, interviewed residents reported no flooding in Santa Rita. Fig.5-4 shows surveyed water 
levels, in close agreement with the simulated surge levels of Fig.5-3 (since no flood was measured in Santa Rita, it 
is not included in Fig.5-4).   
Fig.5-5 shows damage along the coast in Uban. The row of homes closest to the shore (near the seawall in the 
foreground of the photo) was destroyed, and one set of concrete stilts can still be seen amongst the wreckage. 
Homes further inland had been damaged, but already rebuilt. Fig.5-6 shows wind waves up to 2 m high impacted 
Uban, and, atop the surge, these were likely responsible for destroying homes along the shoreline. Wind damage 
(i.e., missing roofing sheets) was not as severe in Uban as it was further south, and no wind damage was apparent 
in Santa Rita, indicating that the typhoon wind field diminished this far north. In addition to structural damage in 
Uban, surge flooded agricultural land tended by the town, destroying the season’s rice crop due to salinization, and 
damaged the town’s fishing industry because residents are hesitant to eat fish caught nearby the location of so many 




Fig.5-3. Simulated maximum water level due to storm surge near Tacloban. 
 
 





Fig.5-5. Damaged and rebuilt homes in Uban. 
 
 




5.4 Types of damage in Tacloban 
 
Water-related damage in downtown Tacloban varied between two regions of the town: inland and coastal. In inland 
downtown Tacloban, buildings were dirtied by storm surge and by rain falling in through roofs that had been blown 
away. Fig.5-7 and Fig.5-8 show water lines inside buildings in inland downtown Tacloban. Most buildings are built 
of concrete or wood. While concrete buildings are concentrated in downtown Tacloban, poorly built and unsafe 
wooden houses are along the coastline. Typical houses are built with bricks and a longitudinal wire through the 
bricks whenever financial conditions allow for it. Fig.5-9 is the typical brick house wall with only few longitudinal 
reinforced wires and this is common housing structure in Tacloban area. Soft walls and windows were broken out, 
equipment, furniture, and architectural elements inside these buildings were ruined by strong winds and rain. 
Fig.5-10 shows a house in downtown Tacloban that was reconstructed using wooden studs and corrugated 
galvanized iron sheet. Houses along the coast in the Anibong area of Tacloban were also rebuilt with debris and 
distributed tents as shown in Fig.5-11.  
Fig.5-3 shows the area of downtown Tacloban submerged by the storm surge, but Fig.5-6 shows that waves in 
the same location were very small. Waves that were incident onto the city from the bay around it, were broken 
when they impacted structures on the shoreline. Unlike the damage seen in Japan after the 2011 Tsunami, buoyancy 
of structures did not seem to contribute to building failure; this is because in Tacloban most buildings are very 
porous, with water quickly flooding in through doorways and windows.  
Along the coastline of downtown Tacloban, however, the presence of waves atop the wind-driven storm surge 
caused heavy damage. Fig.5-12 shows the remains of a reinforced concrete building, with only its foundation and 
damaged columns still remaining. The rubble of its concrete walls is seen around the building’s floor. Fig.5-13 
shows scour around the foundation of a building along the coastline. This is probably the result of waves; as such 
scour did not exist inland. Another mechanism of damage to coastal buildings was debris impact. Fig.5-14 shows 
the foundation of a house leveled by a ship that lost its moorings in Tacloban Harbor and was then blown onshore 
in a residential area. Many houses along Tacloban’s coastline were leveled by drifting ships. 
 
 




Fig.5-8. Water line inside a building in inland downtown Tacloban.  
 
Fig.5-9. Brick house wall with few longitudinal reinforced wire 
 
Fig.5-10. A partially damaged house reconstructed its outer wall in downtown Tacloban. 
 
a)   b)  






Fig.5-12. Destruction of Reinforced Concrete building in coastal downtown Tacloban.  
 
 





Fig.5-14. Flattening of houses by a drifting ship in coastal Tacloban. 
 
 
5.5 Wind damage 
 
Damage due to extreme wind was present throughout the survey area. The major mechanism of wind damage was 
the ripping off of roofing materials from roof frames. Once the roof was destroyed, rain poured into the structure, 
ruining the architectural elements, equipment, furniture, and other items inside. Fig.5-15 and Fig.5-16 show 
examples of roofs ripped off public structures. In addition to destroyed roofs, wind-borne projectiles shattered 
windows and soft walls.  
The most common roofing material in the region is Corrugated Galvanized Iron (GI) sheets, which are popular 
because of their low cost and ease of installation as shown as Fig.5-16. They are tied to the roofing frame/rafters 
(usually wooden, though sometimes metal) by nails. A common mechanism of failure of these ties is the nails 
ripping through the GI sheet. Sometimes the sheets and the nails are dissimilar metals, which can accelerate 
corrosion of both nail and sheet, further weakening the tie-down. In most cases, the roofing frames themselves 
remained tied down to the building structure quite well; contrast this to the US, in which the most common roof 
failure mode during hurricanes and tornadoes is the entire roofing frame lifting up off the building structure. The 
most direct method of preventing nails from ripping through GI sheet roofs is by using thicker GI sheets. However, 
this increases costs, and some hospitals complained that thicker GI sheets were not available (not in stock locally) 
for use in repair or reconstruction of their roofs after Haiyan, so thin GI sheets were used instead.  
Fig.5-17 shows a building that was totally damaged by wind and storm surge, and Fig.5-18 is a health facility 
partially damaged by only wind. Both health facilities were not functioning as of mid-January, 2014.  
Coconut trees dominate the vegetation in eastern Leyte Island. These are the source of the coconut oil industry in 
the area. Many trees fell and snapped off their trunks during the storm. A devastated canopy of coconut trees was 




Fig.5-15. Roof damage at a public area in Tacloban.  
 
 




Fig.5-17. Roof damage at a hospital in Palo (south of Tacloban).  
 
Fig.5-18. Tacloban Doctor’s Medical Center affected by only strong wind. 
 
Fig.5-19. The canopy of coconut trees was destroyed by strong wind. 
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5.6 Eastern Samar damage 
 
The eastern coast of Samar faces directly into the Pacific Ocean, thus it was exposed to the 20 m height (offshore) 
waves generated during Haiyan. Most of the eastern coast drops rapidly to deep water, with coral reefs along the 
shoreline. However, there is a small, shallow bay (Matarinao Bay) near the town of General MacArthur. As 
Fig.5-20 shows, high water levels (6 to 10 m) were measured along the coastline. Inside Matarinao Bay, lower 
flood levels (about 3 m) were inferred via interviews.  
Near the Guiuan PAGASA station, Fig.5-21 shows a surge (mostly from wave setup) of 3 to 4 m, and wave 
heights of about 3 m on the landward side of the reef. Approximating runup as surge plus wave height (i.e. against a 
vertical wall), the 6.6 m recorded water level is reasonable. Fig.5-22 shows a foundation destroyed by the flood. 
Scour of sand under the foundation is responsible for some of the damage, as well as wave forces. Concrete blocks 
from foundations were drifted up to 30 m landward by the waves. In addition to the damage on the coast, the flood 
propagated far inland. Fig.5-23 shows a school building half kilometer inland flooded by the surge. However, due 
to lack of ground-level topography data in this location, inundation here cannot be simulated. Since a palm forest 
over 1/2 km wide separated this school from the coast, waves could no longer have been sizeable by the time they 
reached this location, so it is likely that the flood here was due to surge induced by wave setup.  
Further north, in a coastal Barangay of Salcedo, total water level was measured to have been at least 11.5 m 
above mean sea level. Fig.5-24 shows a toilet vault along a debris line located on land at 9 m above mean sea level, 
and a building with its top story washed away. The base of the top story is located at 11.5 m above mean sea level.  
From these photos, it is evident that scour was also a major cause of destruction. The toilet vault had been buried in 
the sand before the storm, so sand around the vault must have been scoured to have allowed the vault to float. Sever 
scour (greater than 1 m) is also seen around the foundation of the house in Fig.5-24. Scour caused the house’s 
approach stairway to collapse, though the house itself remained standing because its foundation footings remained 
partially supported by sand. The reason total water level was higher in Salcedo than in Guiuan was probably 
because the reef in Salcedo was much narrower than it was at the Guiuan site, allowing larger waves to runup 
onshore, whereas at the Guiuan site waves broke over the reef, causing a large setup but lower wave heights 
onshore.  
Fig.5-25 shows surge elevation and wave heights along the northern segment of Eastern Samar surveyed. At 
Quinapondan and General MacArthur, due to wave breaking over the broad reef at the entrance to Matarinao Bay, 
wave breaking inside the shallow bay itself, and shielding by islands inside the bay, wave heights were small.  
However, surge inside the bay, due to both wind-induced and wave-induced setup, was about 3 m above Mean Sea 
Level. This agrees with the water level measurements of Fig.5-20 at the locations inside Matarinao Bay. Fig.5-26 
shows damage seen in the fishing village of Quinapondan surveyed. Some traditional low-lying wooden homes on 
stilts were destroyed by the surge, but damage was not widespread, probably due to the lack of large waves. A 
similar situation existed in the town of General MacArthur.  
Further to the north, in the town of Hernani, damage was severe. Fig.5-25 shows about 3 m of surge and 3 m 
wave heights, thus about 6 m runup height would be expected on the landward side of the reef; however, runup up 
to 9 m was reported by eyewitness accounts (Fig.5-20), indicating that local topography might have played a role in 
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enhancing damage to this town (ground-level topography and actual nearshore bathymetry data for this area were 
not available). This town has been repeatedly damaged by typhoons, and had even been relocated from its previous 
location further southwest after the town in that location had been destroyed by a typhoon. Hernani has two 
seawalls, an old one slightly offshore which had already been demolished by previous storms, and a new one at the 
shoreward edge of the town. Nonetheless, damage to Hernani was severe. Fig.5-27 shows an example of scour 
measured in the town. Fig.5-28 shows the remaining frame columns of a wooden house washed away by a 
bore-like surge (filmed by Nickson Gensis, a member of Plan Philippines International). Fig.5-29 shows the 
damage seen along the coast of the town, reinforced concrete structures demolished by waves riding atop surge. 
Note that the bore-like surge that struck Hernani may have been a localized phenomenon; Monserrat et al. (2006) 
describes the phenomenon of meteotsunamis, localized tsunami-like long waves generated by an atmospheric 
disturbance and enhanced by interaction with local bathymetry. The surge in Hernani may have been an example of 
this phenomenon, or it may have been due to infragravity motions such as surf beat. Research on this topic is 
underway.  
In Llorente, north of Hernani, maximum water level was reported by witnesses to be up to 6 m above Mean Sea 
Level (Fig.5-20). However, the town experienced little damage. One reason for this is the elevation of the town, the 
coastal part of which is about 5 m above Mean Sea Level; this is in contrast to Hernani, where most of the 
devastated area was at most 3.5 m above Mean Sea Level. Also different from Hernani is that Llorente is in a bay 
and has no coral reef offshore. The lack of a coral reef would have allowed larger wave heights to reach the town’s 
coast, but may have resulted in a smaller surge (wave setup) than existed at Hernani (Fig.5-25); however, the model 
resolution is too coarse, and nearshore bathymetry data nonexistent, making accurate hindcasting of the wave 
behavior near Llorente’s coast difficult. 
 
 












Fig.5-21. Surge water level and significant wave height near Guiuan.  
 
 
Fig.5-22. Damage near Guiuan PAGASA station. Damaged foundation located 4 m above Mean Sea Level. 
 
 










Fig.5-24. Damage in a coastal Barangay of Salcedo. Toilet vault (left) deposited on land at 9 m above Mean Sea 
Level. (right) top story at 11.6 m above Mean Sea Level washed away.  
 
 
Fig.5-25. Surge water level and significant wave height near Hernani.  
 
 






Fig.5-27. Scour up to 1 m deep around foundation in Hernani.  
 
Fig.5-28. Piles of house washed away by bore-like surge in Hernani.  
 
Fig.5-29. Debris from reinforced concrete house along coast in Hernani.  
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5.7 Seawall damage 
 
Seawall damage was observed in areas with significant wave activity, both in Leyte and Eastern Samar. Fig.5-30 
shows one of the breaches on the eastern shoreline of Tacloban Airport. The seawall was pushed from its base a few 
meters inland. Fig.5-31 shows similar damage at the MacArthur Memorial on the east coast of Palo, just south of 
Tacloban Airport. Damage was similar, with the revetment parapet pushed landward. The Palo seawall was a 
rubble-fill concrete structure with a concrete parapet. Fig.5-3 and Fig.5-6 show the maximum storm surge height 
and significant wave height at each of these sites. Surface waves were 3-4 meters high, on top of a 3-4 meter 
sustained surge. Since each seawall crest was about 3 m above water level, the mean water level (surge) reached at 
least the top of the parapets. This allowed the waves striking the seawalls to impact the full frontal area of the 
seawalls, and exert a large horizontal force. In addition, buoyancy caused by submergence of the seawalls reduced 
their weight, making them easier to slide. Finally, as seen clearly in Fig.5-31, overtopping caused severe scour 
landward of the seawalls, allowing them to be more easily displaced landward.  
Fig.5-32 shows the Hernani seawall in Eastern Samar. This seawall is a coral-fill embankment topped by a 
concrete parapet and covered with grouted concrete armor on the landward and seaward faces. The Hernani seawall 
was breached in multiple locations. Coral-fill debris and pieces of the parapet and facing armor were scattered both 
landward and seaward of the wall’s original location. Fig.5-33 shows a steady surge of over 3 m near Hernani, 
indicating that water had risen to at least the crest of the seawall. Fig.5-33 also shows wave heights on the landward 
side of Hernani’s coral reef to also have been over 3 m. Since these waves were incident atop surge, they struck the 
seawall directly, and the impact force caused the destruction seen in Fig.5-32.  
Fig.5-34 shows the seawall in Llorente, north of Hernani. This seawall consists of a concrete bulkhead wall held 
in place by gravity to retain fill used to elevate the town’s coastline. The top section of the bulkhead wall is a 
recurved parapet. This seawall experienced no visible damage, indicating that the presence of fill behind the 
bulkhead wall prevented the wall from sliding under the wave forces to which it had been exposed. In addition to 
the strength imparted against sliding by fill, it’s likely this seawall contained rebar sufficient to prevent the parapet 
section of the wall from breaking off the bulkhead section; this is in contrast to Fig.5-31 and Fig.5-32, where the 
parapet section of each wall sheared off the revetment or bulkhead section. Another factor that likely prevented 
failure of the Llorente seawall is the concrete deck covering the fill on its landward side; this likely acted as armor 
to prevent scour of the fill behind the wall during wave overtopping of the parapet (wave overtopping of up to 2 m 
was reported by witnesses); this is in contrast to Fig.5-31, in which scour of the landside fill allowed waves to push 






Fig.5-30. Seawall breach on eastern coastline of Tacloban Airport. Crest height 3 m above Mean Sea Level. 
 
 
Fig.5-31. Seawall damage at the MacArthur Memorial south of Tacloban Airport. Crest height 3 m above Mean Sea 
Level.  
 
















5.8 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
An on-site field survey in Leyte and Eastern Samar was conducted by the Hazard and Damage Evaluation Team, 
IRIDeS from January 16 through 24, 2014 in order to investigate damage due to storm surge, large waves, and 
strong wind induced by super typhoon Haiyan. 
  Inundation heights due to storm surge and high waves were measured by the team in Leyte and Samar and an 
inundation map of Tacloban city was developed mainly through local interviews. Storm surge heights up to 6 m 
were measured near the shoreline in Tacloban. Moreover, survivors reported waves up to 4 m high atop the surge. It 
was found from the survey that the surge travelled far to the north in the Samar-Leyte strait. Local river flooding 
and landslides due to heavy rainfall were also observed at several points in Tacloban and Palo. Also, runup due to 
large waves (up to 12 m) was measured in Eastern Samar.  
  Several types of damage induced by Haiyan were described in this chapter. Along the coastline of downtown 
Tacloban the presence of waves atop the wind-driven storm surge caused heavy damage. While concrete buildings 
are concentrated in downtown Tacloban, poorly built unsafe wooden houses are along the coastline because of 
poverty, causing vulnerability of Tacloban city against coastal water-related hazards. Another mechanism of 
damage to coastal buildings was debris impact. Also, seawall damage was observed in areas with significant wave 
activity, both in Leyte and Eastern Samar. 
Damage due to wind was present throughout the survey area. The major mechanism of wind damage was ripping 
of the roofing materials off the roofing frame of each structure. Once a structure’s roof was destroyed, rain poured 
into the structure, ruining the architectural elements, equipment, furniture, and other items inside.  
The eastern coast of Samar faces directly into the open Pacific Ocean, and so was exposed to the 20 m high 
waves (offshore) generated during the Haiyan event. Scour of sand by large waves of the foundations of houses is 
responsible for some of the damage, but wave force is also responsible for much of the damage. It should be 
emphasized that the bore-like surge that struck Hernani and washed away some houses. The bore-like surge may 
have been an example of a localized phenomenon such as a meteotsunami, generated by an atmospheric 
disturbance and enhanced by interaction with local bathymetry, or it may have been an infragravity motion such as 
surf beat, but research on this is continuing.  
From the survey the team concluded that storm surge, large waves, and high speed wind induced by Haiyan 
caused enormous damage to people, buildings and coastal structures in Leyte and Samar, and the vulnerability of 
the coastal area and fragility of houses made the damage more serious. Data analysis and numerical simulations of 
Haiyan are ongoing, but analysis and the survey results thus far have produced the following recommendations: 
 
 Several observation weather stations should be installed for the monitoring of the wind speed, air pressure, 
tide level, rainfall, etc. The monitoring system should be protected against strong wind and storm surge, so 
that it should be effective even in the event of a super typhoon like Haiyan. 
 Inland topography and local bathymetry along the coast should be measured in more detail for the numerical 
simulation of the storm surge and large waves in order to compute the inundation situation more precisely and 
clarify the mechanism of localized phenomena such as the bore-like surge that struck Hernani. 
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 Storm surge hazard maps should be updated and developed in coastal areas in the Philippines under the worst 
scenario considering the impacts of climate change, land use/cover change, etc. 
 Seawalls should be reconstructed and multiple countermeasures such as combinations of seawalls, tide-water 
control forests, no building zones, etc. should be developed. These systems should be evaluated from the view 
point of efficiency, low cost and easy maintenance. 
 New building structures and roofing system should be developed to withstand strong wind speeds during super 
typhoons. A small design change such as implementing a curved roof, using thicker GI sheets instead thin GI 
sheets, and screws instead of nails for connections may make a big difference and might cost less and save 
lives. The effects of these design changes should be quantitatively evaluated.  
 Selection and construction of suitable evacuation centers and places 
 Education to emphasize the urgency of evacuation 





Adriano, B., Gokon, H., Mas, E., Koshimura, S., Liu, W., Matsuoka, M., Extraction of damaged areas due to the 
2013 Haiyan typhoon using ASTER data, Proceedings of the International Geoscience and Remote Sensing 
Symposium IGARSS 2014 and 35th Canadian Symposium on Remote Sensing CSRS, Quebec, Canada, 2014. 
(Abstract accepted). 
Bricker, J., Takagi, H., Mas, E., Kure, S., Adriano, B., Yi, C., and Roeber, V., Spatial variation of damage due to 
storm surge and waves during Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, 
Ser. B2 (Coastal Engineering), Vol. 70, No. 2., 2014 (Abstract accepted). 
Kure, S., Anawat, S., Yi, C.J., Mas, Erick., Bricker, J.D., Koshimura, S., and Mano, A.: Human loss due to storm 
surge disaster caused by typhoon Haiyan in coastal region of Leyte island, Journal of Japan Society of Civil 
Engineers, Ser. B2 (Coastal Engineering), Vol.70, No.2, 2014 (Abstract accepted), in Japanese. 
Mas, E., Kure, S., Bricker, J., Adriano, B., Yi, C., Suppasri, A., Koshimura, S., Field survey and damage inspection 
after the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in The Philippines, Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser. B2 (Coastal 
Engineering), Vol. 70, No. 2., 2014 (Abstract accepted). 
Monserrat, S., Vilibic, I., and Rabinovich, A.B., Meteotsunamis: atmospherically induced destructive ocean waves in the 
tsunami frequency band.  Natural Hazards and Earth Systems Science. Vol. 6, pp.1035-1051, 2006. 
Tajima, Y., Yasuda T., Pacheco, B.M., Cruz, E.C., Kawasaki, K., Nobuoka, H., Miyamoto, M., Asano, Y., Arikawa, 
T., Ortigas, N.M., Aquino, R., Mata, W., Valdez, J., and Briones, F., Initial report of JSCE-PICE joint survey on 











Warning and Evacuation Assessment Team aims at examining and recording evacuation behavior and information 
notification in the affected area by Haiyan. Empirical studies contribute to develop policies that will mitigate 
damages by coming typhoons in the future. 
Although the team employed both of qualitative and quantitative methods for collecting information, it is 
focused on delivering some preliminary results by the qualitative approach in this article.  
 
Warning and Evacuation Assessment Team 
1.  Ass. Prof. Yasuhito Jibiki (Team Leader, International Regional Cooperation Office) 
2.  Assoc. Prof. Miwa Kuri (International Regional Cooperation Office) 
3.  Ass. Prof. Shuichi Kure (Disaster Potential Study) 
 
6.2 Method: Social survey 
 
A questionnaire survey at Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan cities in Leyte Island was implemented from 14th March 
2014 to 22nd March 2014. These three cities in the Philippines had different types of damages by storm surge, wind, 
and torrential rains.  
Fig.6-1 shows the death and missing ratio of each barangay in three cities based on hearing data from city 
governments and barangay offices. The designed total sample size is 600 and individual sample size of three cities 
is 200. High ratio sites are picked up in three cities as target sites. The complex situation and the heavy damages 
prevent the survey from employing the random sampling method based on the residential lists. 
200 samples divide into 8 cells based on the population condition of generation and gender. The generation 
brackets are composed of 4 groups: 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and over 50. According to National Statistics Office of the 
Filipino government, the ratio of male and female are almost same. Thus, the each number of the sample is divided 
equally in terms of gender. Contrary, the number of the young generation is larger than that of the elder (see Table 
6-1). Therefore, designed number of 200 samples is allocated into 8 cells on actual population condition (see Table 
6-2). 
In addition with the settings above, geographical closeness are also considered. In each sites, it is biased if 
many samples are selected from specific barangays. However, the number of the samples in the survey is limited. 
Thus, samples are gathered from some barangays where locate along with coastal line of San Pedro and San Pablo 
Bay, and each barangays exist nearby in each other. For the control of geographical factors and hazard 
characteristics, the survey did not intend to distribute samples in Samar or other islands. 
Each respondent were interviewed by enumerators. Finally 642 samples are gained. The final number of 
samples is bigger than the original designed number. Although in gender condition the number of female is slightly 
larger than that of male, a chi-square test demonstrates that the difference does not have statistical significance. In 
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generation condition, the number of gained samples in each site is varied, but no statistical significance is observed 
amongst the difference. The final sample size is enough to be similar with the original designed sample size in the 
population condition of attribute, generation and gender.  
For complementary information, 645 residents joined the survey, but 3 samples were excluded because their age 
was under 20 years old. Table 6-3 shows the total number of the samples is 641. However, as shown in a note of 
Table 6-3, a respondent did not answer its gender and the respondent is included in the analysis in this report. 
 
Source: Hearing data from offices of city government and barangay by the authors 
Fig.6-1. Distribution of the death and missing ratio of each Barangay in survey area. 
 
Table 6-1. Distribution of age population. 
Age 20-29 30 - 39 40 - 49 Over 50 
Ratio 30.5% 24.6% 19.6% 25.2% 
Note: Age under 19 years old are excluded in the calculation. 























Table 6-2. Design of allocated sample size in each cites (sample size: 200)． 
Age 20-29 30 - 39 40 - 49 Over 50 Sum 
Male 30 25 20 25 100 
Female 30 25 20 25 100 
Sum 60 50 40 50 200 
Source: This table is made by the authors. 
Table 6-3. The number of the obtained samples by each survey sites. 
Tacloban 
 20s 30s 40s Over 50s Sum 
Male 30 (14.4%) 24 (11.5%) 25 (12.0%) 22 (10.5%) 101 (48.3%) 
Female 31 (14.8%) 29 (13.9%) 22 (10.5%) 26 (12.4%) 108 (51.7%) 
Sum 61 (29.2%) 53 (25.4%) 47 (22.5%) 48 (23.0%) 209 (100.0%) 
 
Palo 
 20s 30s 40s Over 50s Sum 
Male 31 (14.5%) 26 (12.1%) 21 (9.8%) 27 (12.6%) 105 (49.1%)
Female 31 (14.5%) 31 (14.5%) 21 (9.8%) 26 (12.1%) 109 (50.9%)
Sum 62 (29.0%) 57 (26.6%) 42 (19.6%) 53 (24.8%) 214 (100.0%)
 
Tanauan 
 20s 30s 40s Over 50s Sum 
Male 30 (13.8%) 28 (12.8%) 20 (9.2%) 27 (12.4%) 105 (48.2%)
Female 31 (14.2%) 31 (14.2%) 22 (10.1%) 29 (13.3%) 113 (51.8%)
Sum 61 (28.0%) 59 (27.1%) 42 (19.3%) 56 (25.7%) 218 (100.0%)
 
Total (Tacloban + Palo + Tanauan) 
 20s 30s 40s Over 50s Sum 
Male 91 (14.2%) 78 (12.2%) 66 (10.3%) 76 (11.9%) 311 (48.5%)
Female 93 (14.5%) 91 (14.2%) 65 (10.1%) 81 (12.6%) 330 (51.5%)
Sum 184 (28.7%) 169 (26.4%) 131 (20.4%) 157 (24.5%) 641 (100.0%)
Note: One respondent did not answer his/her gender. The respondent lived in Tacloban and 68 
years old. The respondent is included in the analysis.  





6.3 Results on evacuation and discussions 
 
6.3.1 Evacuation behavior 
 
The survey data demonstrates that around 70% of the respondents evacuated to some places except their house (see 
Fig.6-2.). About 30% of the respondents did not evacuate to anywhere outside of their houses. In other words, they 
remained at their houses.  
In the detail analysis, three types of cross tabulation were calculated. Regarding the cross calculation on the 
survey sites, a statistical difference is observed (χ2 (2, N=589) = 8.265, p<.10). The respondents in Tacloban tends 
to not evacuate to anywhere outside of their houses, comparing with those in Palo and Tanauan. In terms of gender, 
a statistical difference is also detected (χ2 (2, N=588) = 8.219, p<.05). The result indicates the male does not tend to 
evacuate to anywhere outside of their houses, in comparison of female. In the analysis between evacuation behavior 
and the age brackets, a statistical difference is observed (χ2 (2, N=589) = 15.447, p<.01). According to Fig.6-2, the 
ratio in 30s and “Not evacuated” is higher than those of others. And, the percentage in over 50s and “Not evacuated” 
is also bigger than those of 20s and 40s.  
These results implies that people in Tacloban has a different view on evacuation in the case of Haiyan, 
comparing with Palo and Tanauan. Thus, in further analysis, it seems important to examine the geographical 
uniqueness. Also, the statistical difference in gender and the age brackets, it can be interpreted that typical tendency 
might be observed in the case of Haiyan. Many cases in natural disasters, male hesitates in being absent from its 
house, and the elder has a comparatively greater difficulties in moving from its house to another places.  
 
6.3.2 Reasons for evacuation to outside of houses 
 
In the survey, the respondents, who answered that they evacuated to outside of houses, showed reasons for their 
behavior. The largest response is the recognition for the approach of super typhoon (37.7%). Next to that, the notion 
for the strong wind was high (30.0%). The role of barangay leaders (barangay captains) is the third largest (26.3%). 
It can be argued that the role of barangay leaders seems to be less significant rather than spontaneous evacuation by 
residents. 
Results of cross calculations between the reason and the survey sites might imply that decisions by people in 
Tanauan were quicker than those of Tacloban and Palo. Statistical differences are observed in three answers (see 
items highlighted by red boxes in Fig.6-3). It can be interpreted that people in Tanauan did not wait for other 
persons’ decisions, because the ratio in Tanauan is the lowest in “Whole Barangay member decided to do that.” 
Also, the least percentages in the answer 7 and 8 might indicate that people in Tanauan did not face with or tried to 
avoid crisis of their lives. On the contrary, people in Tacloban evacuated because their houses were getting flooded 
due to sea water, and it means they have already been inundated and surrounded by water. Regarding “I felt I might 





6.3.3 Reasons for not evacuated to outside of houses (remained at houses) 
 
In contrast to reasons for evacuation to outside of houses, the survey had a question for those who remained at their 
houses. The most common answer is “the wave should not be that large” (64.8%). The second largest percentage is 
“my house was strong enough” (31.8%). These results indicate that many people were not able to imagine how 
Haiyan was severe. Furthermore, it is questionable for adequateness for contents of information including warnings 
and news programs which was disseminated prior to Haiyan’s landfall. 
Cross tabulation analysis demonstrates four reasons have statistical significance with the difference of the 
survey sites (see items highlighted by red boxes in Fig.6-4). It can be considered that people in Tacloban and in 
Tanauan had a different point. Based on Tacloban response, people had sufficient knowledge about behavior in the 
emergency (in answer 1 of Fig.6-4, Tacloban has 0.0%), but they were unable to estimate Haiyan’s influence (see 
answer 2 in Fig.6-4). On the other hand, people in Tanauan were aware that their land was not high enough against 
Haiyan (see answer 2 in Fig.6-4), but they had no idea how to behave in face of disasters (see answer 1 in Fig.6-4). 
These difference seems to mention the importance to disseminate information and evacuation instructions taking 
into account of local contexts.  
 
Note 1: Since one respondents did not answer its gender and was not able to include the calculation, the 
sum of the number of male and female is different from those of sites and age brackets.  
Note 2: No answers and wrong answers are excluded in the analysis. 
Source: This figure is made by the authors. 
















































Note: Answers highlighted by red boxes have statistical difference among the survey sites. 
Source: This figure is made by the authors. 
Fig.6-3. Reasons for evacuation to outside of houses (Multiple answer). 
 
Note: Answers highlighted by red boxes have statistical difference among the survey sites. 
Source: This figure is made by the authors. 
Figure 6-4. Reasons for not evacuated to outside of houses (remained at houses) (Multiple answer). 













Total (N=414) Tacloban (N=132) Palo (N=128) Tanauan (N=154)














Total (N=176) Tacloban (N=71) Palo (N=55) Tanauan (N=50)
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6.4 Preliminary summary 
 
This survey shows that the ratio of evacuation to the outside of houses is relatively high. However, evacuation in 
detail differs with sites, gender and age. Reasons and clues for evacuation to outside of houses and reasons for 
remaining at houses are also depend on the difference of sites. Although the survey sites locate in the same island 
and share the same coastal line, local characteristics are observed in the preliminary analysis. The finding is 
considered to be utilized in further inquiries.  
It is required to clearly state that the research has two limitation. Just as a great problem which was occurred in 
Great East Japan Earthquake, a social survey by the team is able to contribute for revealing only survivors’ 
behaviors. In other words, the analysis is lack of viewpoints from those who could not be survivors. Critical 
questions for identifying factors which differentiate survivors or not are complemented by qualitative interviews by 
survivors partially. Regarding the method in the survey, it cannot be said that the sampling covered the all affected 
area. Not only in Leyte Island, but also in Samar, Cebu and other islands, the large number of population was 
damaged by Haiyan. The results of the survey are required to be compared with other efforts. 
   In addition with the quantitative survey, the team conducted interviews in Samar Island (Samar Island is next to 
Leyte Island). Interviews were conducted in western parts of Samar. The team visited Basay and Marabut. Costal 
Barangays in Basay were severely affected by the storm surge. Contrary, damages in Marabut were due to the 
strong wind rather than the surge. The city of Calbayog was selected for complementary analysis. The city had 
relatively smaller damages by the typhoon, and supported affected local governments in Leyte Island. The 
interviewees are varied from the city mayor to Barangay captains and affected residents. These interviewees 
responded to questions about early warning, disaster information dissemination and public awareness for the 





















Warning and Evacuation Assessment Team appreciates great contributions by Mr. Agathon Paul D. Tupaz, Mr. 
Christer Kim O. Gerona, Ms. Catherine Anne E. Sandagan, Mr. Janina Mae T. Elardo, Ms. Marie Elaine C. Roa, Mr. 
Ginbert P. Cuaton, Mr. Mark Jacob L. de Paz, Ms. Mary Kathlene A. So, Ms. Maiden Pearl Catilogo, Ms. Danica 
Mae D. Ballon, Ms. Ma. Veah Luisa O. Pascasio, Mr. Jed. P. Morantte, Mr. Jude M. Ubalde, Mr. Aibelle Cay Z. 
Tingzon, Ms. Flora Mae G. Sañosa, Ms. Michaela Rosabelle D. Magsangkay, Ms. Diana Grace A. Ellema, Mr. 
Sharmaine Joy P. Enales, Mr. Coleen O. Alonzo, Mr. Regine S. Abalos (students of University of the Philippines 
Tacloban). Even though they themselves were severely affected by the typhoon, they played the role of enumerators 
in the social survey. Without their efforts, the survey could have not been achieved. 
   Logistical supports by Mr. Jun Baldesco, Ms. Beverly Dosal and Mr. Elmer Campomayor were essential of the 
accomplishment of the survey. 
Warning and Evacuation Assessment Team is also grateful for contributions by Dr. Naomi Hosoda (Kagawa 
University, Assistant Professor) and Dr. Hiroyuki Yamamoto (Kyoto University). While Dr. Hosoda provided 
contact information for conducting interview surveys to the team, Dr. Yamamoto input basic livelihood information 
in Calbayog city (Samar Island) to the team. Also, the team appreciates supports from Ms. Takagi Michiyo 




























In order to establish the international standards for effective medical and public health response, Division of 
Disaster Medical Research has missions to investigate the acute and chronic phase of the response and recovery 
together with preparedness. In this Typhoon Haiyan disaster, we investigated the immediate medical and public 
health response, domestic and international medical aids, outbreak of infectious diseases, psychosocial problems 
and mental health of the affected people. We collaborated with the medical and public health researchers in 
Philippines, WHO, Department of Health and others to promote collaborative research and publicizing of the 
results.  
 
Disaster Medical Research Team 
1.  Prof. Shinichi Egawa (Team Leader, International Cooperation for Disaster Medicines) 
2.  Prof. Toshio Hattori (Disaster-related Infectious Disease)  
3.  Prof. Hiroaki Tomita (Disaster Psychiatry) 




Disaster Medical Research Teams were dispatched in the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 6th investigations. 
1.  Common themes 
a. Interview at Japanese Embassy about their response and health problems of Japanese residents. 
b. Establishment of educational system in collaboration with the medical and health related universities about 
Disaster Medicine 
c. Establishment of collaboration with University of Philippines Manila (UP Manila) and Angeles University 
through MOAs. 
d. Establishment of collaborative relationship with DOH, WHO and WPRO 
 
2.  Division of International Cooperation for Disaster Medicine (Prof. Egawa) 
a. Investigation of structural, non-structural and functional damage of hospitals, Rural Healthcare Unit, 
Barangay Health System and other related facilities according to the satellite images. 
b. Post disaster change of the medical and public health needs of the affected people and areas. 
c. Elucidation of the obstacles to recovery and reconstruction of the damaged health related facilities. 
d. Observation of health and sanitary condition of the affected people together with some interviews 
e. Investigation of damage and reconstruction plan of medical educational institutions such as UPM-SHS, 
RTR foundation, Bethany Hospital. 
f. Discussion and recommendation in the DOH about the “Safe Hospital” concept. Structural, non-structural 
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and functional strengthening of the hospitals including hospital BCP, network promotion and systemic 
disaster medical response preparedness. 
g. Investigation of domestic and international medical aids in collaboration with DOH and WHO.  
h. Interview with JICA about their concept and role in the reconstruction of health related facilities. 
 
3.  Division of Disaster Related Infectious Disease (Prof. Hattori) 
a. The sanitary condition of affected area and the occurrence of Dengue, Leptospirosis, Tetanus, Measles, 
Tuberculosis, HIV and others. 
b. Establishment of early detection system and pathological analysis of the infectious diseases in collaboration 
with San Lazaro Hospital. 
c. A questionnaire survey health personnel in the Philippines to investigate a) awareness of the international 
frameworks related to disaster medicine and humanitarian response and b) risk perception of natural 
disasters and disaster-related infectious diseases. 
 
4.  Division of Disaster Psychiatry (Prof. Tomita) 
a. Investigation of mental health care of Japanese residents. 
b. Establishment of collaborative mental health research with researchers in Philippines. 
c. Investigation of the current situation and future perspectives of psychological primary care in the medical 




1. Geographical mapping of the possible hospitals and health related facilities in the affected area in collaboration 
with remote sensing team (Dr. Carine Yi). Based on the prepared map, individual visit of the facilities and 
interviews with the medical directors of the hospitals together with architect from University of Philippines (Mr. 
Karl Taberdo). 
2. Visiting the tent and temporary housing areas to observe the sanitary and health condition of the affected 
people with some interviews.  
3. Visiting the international agents for humanitarian assistance including Red Cross, MSF and others. 
4. Based on the MOA and collaborative history with San Lazaro Hospital (Dr. Elizabeth Telan), extended 
collaboration with DOH (Drs. Marilyn Go, Winston Go, Carmencita Banatin and Alex Dimapilis), WHO (Drs. 
Arturo Pesigan, Lester Geroy, Alice Ruth Foxwell and Jonathan Abrahams) and WPRO (Dr. Nevio Zagaria) 
to get the information about health cluster approach and humanitarian assistance. 
5. Visiting Japanese Embassy (Drs. Junichi Nitta, Yasuyuki Matsumoto and Akira Yokoyama) and JICA (Ms. 
Atsuko ltsuki) to interview their health related response and plan. 
6. Attending the annual congress of Philippines Psychological Association and DOH to get connected with the 







7.4.1 Hospital Damages 
We could visit the pre-searched hospitals and health related facilities as shown in Table 7-1. The mapping of 
hospitals and health related facilities through satellite images was quite useful for the comprehensive investigations. 
It is strongly recommended for the local governments and all clusters share such multi-information-layered maps at 
the time of disaster. Strong wind, heavy rain and storm surge devastated many hospitals and health related facilities 
not only in the coastal areas but also in the inlands (Fig.7-1). The damage to the roofs and windows paralyzed the 
function of the hospitals including X-rays, CT, MRI and laboratory instruments. There remained only one CT in 
Tacloban and Palo area (Fig.7-1, #5). The only psychological ward in that area was also devastated (Fig.7-1, #13). 
Most of the hospital rooms were too damaged to accept patients. Many hospitals accommodated small number of 
in-patients and kept the out-patient department partly open (ex. Fig.7-1, #10). There were almost daily 
deliveries in the maternity hospitals during the disaster. Nurses and midwiferies took care of the 
deliveries. The students also helped as much as possible to treat the patients. 
Most of the hospitals saved the lives of in-patients as much as possible and among the facilities we visited only 
one patient in ICU lost his life due to the power outage as summarized in Table 7-2. The workers in the hospitals 
were also saved. There is the possibility, however, that patients who can go home in preparation to the Typhoon 
might have lost their lives. Most of the hospitals utilized the limited resources to keep running the out-patient 
departments to accept the surge of medical needs. Two hospitals had to completely shut down due to the complete 
outage of the resources (Fig.7-1, #7 and #6) at the time of our visit. One of these was taken over by Doctors 
Without Borders (MSF) to use the ward as the outpatient clinic and was planning to reopen the hospital in May, 
2014 (Fig.7-1, #6). 
The buildings of the hospitals were built according to the latest building code to endure 200 km/h wind, but the 
real strength of the Typhoon exceeded the expectations (Fig.7-1, #5). Most of the hospitals had emergency power 
generator and water stock for daily use (not for drink). Fortunately, there was no lack of fuel supply for cars and 
emergency generators. Drinking water for the patients and staffs was provided by the city authority and 
international aids. Propane gas was used for cooking the meals in the hospital. Small number of the hospital had a 
contraction with the food vendors. Thus the outage of the lifelines of the hospital was limited, though the 
rehabilitation of the building was still on-going two months after disaster. 
The preparedness of medical and health related facilities had been strengthened by the governance of 
DOH/HEMS (Health Emergency Management Staff) before the Typhoon. Every hospital should have disaster 
manager to be licensed and “Safe Hospital Campaign” was promoted by DOH in collaboration with WHO from 
2008 to 2010. EVRMC owned by DOH (Fig.7-1, #1), the biggest tertiary center in the region, was inundated by the 
similar storm surge about 100 years ago but was not relocated. This time, the government decided to relocate the 
hospital to the safer place. JICA was planning to assist the reconstruction of EVRMC out-patient department, and 
was also intending to effectively assist the reconstruction of Rural Health Unit (RHU) that is important for the 
primary health care. 
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The information sharing at the onset of disaster still had problems, even the Typhoon developed very rapidly. 
Some hospital (Fig.7-1, #4) protected its glass wall by temporally shielding structures and had less damage to the 
wards. This hospital relocated the medical records to third floor and protected the record from storm surge 
inundation (Fig.7-1, #4). The remained CT scan in the region was located deep inside of the hospital to avoid the 
rain fall from the damaged roof (Fig.7-1, #5). This hospital also located the laboratory instruments at the deep 
inside and protected from the rain damage, though its ICU was totally devastated by the strong wind and rain 
though the broken glass window (Fig.7-1, #5). 
  
 
Table 7-1. Hospitals and health related facilities in the affected area 
ID Name Address 
1 Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC) Tacloban 
2 Ultrascan Diagnostic Center & Healthcare Services Tacloban 
3 Philippine National Red Cross Tacloban 
4 Divine World Hospital Tacloban 
5 Tacloban Doctors Medical Center Tacloban 
6 Bethany Hospital Tacloban 
7 Tacloban Maternity Hospital Tacloban 
8 Mother of Mercy Hospital Tacloban 
9 Remedios Trinidad Romualdez Medical Foundation (RTR) Tacloban 
10 Tacloban City Hospital Tacloban 
11 Leyte Provincial Hospital Tacloban 
12 U. of the Philippines Manila School of Health Sciences (UPM-SHS) Palo 




























ID Name Beds Human injury Type of damage Current Function 
1 Eastern Visayas Regional 
Medical Center 
360 3 medical staff 
0 patient 
Surge & Wind Active 
2 Ultrascan Diagnostic Center 
& Healthcare Services 
0? Not visited Surge & Wind Closed? (Sunday) 
3 Philippine National Red 
Cross (operation center) 
0 ? Surge & Wind Active 
4 Divine World Hospital 160 1 Guard 
0 patient 
Surge & Wind Active 
5 Tacloban Doctors Medical 
Center 
35 0 medical staff 
0 patient 
Wind Active (CT) 
6 Bethany Hospital (with 
Schools) 
150 1 medical staff 
1 patient in 
ICU 
Surge & Wind Restoring (MSF until 
May) 
7 Tacloban Maternity Hospital ? ? Surge & Wind Closed 
8 Mother of Mercy Hospital ? Not visited Not visited Not visited 
9 RTR Medical Foundation 
(with Schools) 
50 0 medical staff 
0 patient 
Wind Active 
10 Tacloban City Hospital ? ? Wind Active 
11 Leyte Provincial Hospital ? ? Surge & Wind Active 
12 UPM-SHS (Schools) 0 3 students Wind Active 
 
 
7.4.2 Health-related needs of the affected people and the medical aids. 
In fact, 6,300 people were killed by the typhoon and storm surge and more than one million houses were damaged 
(NDRRMC, 2014). Some of the affected people were already living in the restricted zone of within the 40 m from 
the coastal line and getting the food and water supply, partly working or finding any type of livelihoods. 
Many international medical teams came in to provide medical relief and found that the number of injured 
patients was small, but that the medical needs relating diarrhea, pneumonia, bronchial asthma and their prevention 
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were remarkable. Middle to long-term lack of food, lifelines deteriorated the health condition of the affected people 
and increased the risks of malnutrition and outbreaks (Fig.7-2). Water and food was supplied by the local 
government and humanitarian agencies, but the information where and when it will be supplied was insufficient. 
There are thousands of evacuation tents along with the coastal line but the tent did not have floor other than a 
simple sheet, and two to three families were living in one tent (Fig.7-2). The sanitary condition of the affected 
people was also very insufficient, burning foods by the wrecks and debris, washing close, running with sandals in 
the muddy water, toilet on the sea. People were educated not to drink the water from the well, but there are 
increased symptoms of the abdomen especially in the malnutritional areas. 
The elementary school was opened but no lunch is provided. Thus, the children should bring their own lunch or 
had to go back home to eat lunch. This could cause malnutrition of the children and increase the vulnerability. 
The international agencies provided the town clinic and visiting medical cares. JICA provided three terms of JDR 
as medical relief. These were coordinated by the health cluster meetings led by DOH and WHO. One private 
hospital (RTR, Fig.7-1, #9) provided medical care and relief goods to the Tacloban and Palo vicinities as a hub of 









Philippines had incorporated the Surveillance in Post Extreme Emergencies and Disasters (SPEED) system since 
2010 (http://healthmarketinnovations.org/program/surveillance-post-extreme-emergencies-and-disasters-speed). 
This SPEED system collected the number of infectious and common disease occurrence and was effective to assist 
the preventative medical response such as mass vaccination campaign against measles and tetanus, preventative 
drug administrations and the improvement of sanitary conditions.  
San Lazaro Hospital dispatched the special team to provide educations to early detection and treatment of tetanus 
(Dr. Alex Dimapilis). The medical teams through this education successfully saved all patients with tetanus. Most 
of the affected people were living in the coastal area and kids were playing with bare feet where the rusted nails 
from wrecks and debris could cause infection of tetanus. Prevention and the early detection is the only way to save 
the patients with tetanus. 
 
7.4.3 The role of central and local governments and humanitarian agencies 
The domestic and international medical and humanitarian aids were coordinated by the Health Cluster. There was 
few confusions within more than 100 countries, 1,200 delegates from international aids through DOH/WHO 
coordination with back-up from WPRO (Fig.7-3). Even so, the aids tend to concentrate on the Tacloban area which 
was most damaged and therefore the most frequent media appearance. It might have created the unreached area 
where the relief and aids were truly needed. Thus, the multilayered mapping of the affected area based on the 
demographical data is vital to provide effective relief.  
The International and Philippine Red Cross had also cluster approach to provide the relief goods and help 
effectively (Fig.7-3, #3). Philippine Red Cross does not have any its own hospital, but is trained to act as 
emergency and disaster relief. The relief goods and the transfusion blood was stocked and provided at the operation 
center (Fig.7-3, #3). They provided the town clinic using 7-8 ambulance cars with two medical doctors 
and two nurses. This mobile clinic stayed in one place for five hours and cared 80-90 patients/day. 
They made briefings every day to reorganize the plans for effective relief. If the mobile clinic does not 
have a doctor, even the trained surgical nurse felt the frustration of treating the patients. 
The communication was made through satellite phones and the resource was provided from the 
health and welfare sector in the airport. Public health nurses performed the assessment of the 
evacuation shelters and reported to DOH using SPEED system every day. The sanitary condition of 
the people were monitored and helped in collaboration with water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) 
sector. Preventative administration of doxycycline was provided for the people who walked in the 
muddy water to prevent Leptospirosis. Educational gathering of the community people were 
frequently hosted by the humanitarian agents about the nutrition, hygiene and possible diseases in 
the current situation. 
We visited the base camp of the International Association of Red Cross and Red Crescent. The 
concept of base camp was first developed by the Danish Red Cross to provide the comfortable work 
place for the delegates. About 20 big tents with individual tents inside were built as the residential 
areas. There were showers and toilets. They had the water purification system and clean kitchen to 
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provide safe water and foods. They first bring all the materials with them but gradually utilized the 
local resources as much as possible to prevent the suppression to the local industries. They had 
Sunday off so that the delegates could appropriately take rests and provided the mental and physical 
supports.  
 
Fig.7-3. Humanitarian agencies in Tacloban. 
 
In Manila, we shared the experience and the lessons from Great East Japan Earthquake in the technical discussion 
on making our hospitals/health facilities safer in emergencies “My Hospital: Last Building Standing in Disasters” 
in the presence of Secretary Dr. Enrique Ona and Undersecretary Dr. Teodoro J. Herbosa in DOH (Table 7-3). The 
systematic medical response in Japan was presented including Disaster Base Hospital, DMAT, wide area 
transportation, disaster emergency medical information system and medical-public health coordinators. 
 
Table 7-3. My Hospital: Last Building Standing in Disasters: A technical discussion on making our hospitals/health 
facilities safer in emergencies at DOH. 
Opening remarks Hon Secretary Dr. Enrique Ona 
Introduction and 
opening 
Dr Roland Cortes, Assistant Secretary of Health 
Dr Julie Hall, WHO Representative in the Philippines 
Technical presentations Overview: Dr Arturo Pesigan, WHO  
Philippines:  Safe Hospitals Programme: Assessment of Hospitals Dr Marilyn Go, 
Preparedness Div. Chief, HEMS 
Disaster Base Hospitals and Business Continuity Management:  Lessons from the 
Great East Japan Earthquake: Prof Shinichi Egawa, Tohoku University, IRIDeS 
Panel of reactors Representative, Bureau of Design, DPWH 
Atty Violeta Seva, Earthquakes and Megacities, Inc (EMI) 
Professor Ruel Ramirez, UP Diliman 
Technical inputs from 
participants and 
recommendations 
Guided discussion on recommendations for Post Haiyan Recovery and safe hospitals 
Moderator: Dr Sandra Tempongko 
Deputy Director, SEAMEO-TROPMED Network 
 
The Philippine Government worries about the delayed restarting of the schools due to the evacuated people and is 
planning to use hospitals and RHU as evacuation shelters. Further discussion will be necessary to reconstruct the 
health care plans. DOH is emphasizing the safe hospital concept with business continuity plans. The structural, 
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non-structural and functional strengthening will be required.  
The health insurance system in Philippines makes the difference between public hospitals where patient with low 
income can access to the medical service for cheaper expense and private hospitals where people who can afford 
the cost. This made the difference in the financial and temporal difference in the recovery and reconstruction 
process. 
Embassy of Japan in the Philippines contacted all of the Japanese residents in the affected area to make sure the 
safety and physical and mental health conditions, and found out that there seems to be no serious health problems, 
which urge immediate care. 
 
7.4.4 Infectious disease 
Mass vaccination campaign and the extermination of mosquitos prevented the remarkable outbreak of infectious 
diseases. But, there was a tendency of measles outbreaks and the situations such as deteriorated sanitary condition, 
malnutrition and crowded populations especially in the coastal and relocated areas where people cook by burning 
the wrecks suggested the probability of respiratory and digestive disease outbreaks at any time.  
The difficulties of medical access for the affected people will lead to the spontaneous termination of drug 
treatment of HIV or Tuberculosis resulting in the increased frequency of drug-resistance. The demographic 
analyses of the patients are urgently needed. 
The future flooding and mosquito activities will also increase the chance of Dengue and Leptospirosis. In 
collaboration with San Lazaro Hospital, we studied various bio-markers using ELISA and Luminex and found that 
Gal-9 could serve as an important novel biomarker of acute DENV infection and disease severity and potential 
target to control DENV pathogenesis (Haorile et al. 2013).  
We also performed a questionnaire survey that showed the awareness of international frameworks for disaster 
preparedness and response were not so high. Risk perception of natural disaster could be locally rather than 
globally influenced by the profile of natural disaster (Usuzawa et al. 2014). 
Professor Hattori promoted the establishment of collaborative relationship between UP Manila and Angeles 
University. The long collaborative history with San Lazaro hospital made fruitful results not only with infectious 
disease but also the whole activities of Disaster Medical Research Team (Fig.7-4) 
 




7.4.5 Mental health 
The number of psychiatrists in Philippines is quite small as of several hundreds in the country, the majority of 
whom work in urban area around Manila, whereas the Philippine archipelago comprises over 7,000 islands, of 
which about 2,000 are inhabited. These situation causes remarkable shortage of psychiatrists and mental health care 
givers especially in rural areas, including the areas severely affected by Typhoon Haiyan. To improve the situation, 
the Philippine Psychiatry Association had provided a Training of Trainers for a psychosocial Intervention Program 
in Disasters, in 2007 and 2008, to develop leaders in the provision of psychosocial program in their respective 
regions in the country.  
As for psychosocial support for the victims of Haiyan, a local mental health care giver who has taken the training 
course, along with the disaster mental health support teams lead by the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) 
are the core of the mental health response and care for children in disaster, which are supplemented with private 
stakeholders. However, generally speaking, the middle- and long-term mental health supports are very insufficient. 
It is important to centralize the mental health as a framework to improve the primary care and reconstruction in 
collaboration with DOH, National Mental Health Center, Philippine Psychological Association, World Association 
for Psychological Rehabilitation, University of Philippines, and other relevant organizations (Fig.7-5). 
 
 








7.5 Future Perspectives 
 
a.  Investigations of the pathogens of infectious disease in Tacloban and its vicinity in collaboration with EVRMC 
and San Lazaro Hospital, 
b.  Investigation of hospital, RHU and BHS reconstruction in the affected area in collaboration with DOH, JICA, 
WHO and others. 
c.  Analysis of medical needs in the affected area including mental health in collaboration with UPM and others. 
d.  The statistical analysis of international medical aids. 
e.  Promotion of education and research on Disaster Medicine in the collaborative health related universities. 
 
7.6 Establishment of Partnerships 
 
1.  Application of JST-RAPID emergency research project through Letter of Intent from UP Manila 
2.  MOA with San Lazaro Hospital was already concluded. 
3.  MOA with UPM is in progress. 





NDRRMC: Updates re the Effects of Typhoon “YOLANDA” (HAIYAN),  
http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/1177/Update%20Effects%20TY%20YOLANDA%2017%20Apri
l%202014.pdf 
Haorile C-Y., L.C. Ndhlovu, T.L. Lacuesta, T. Kubo, P.S.A. Leano, T. Niki, S. Oguma, K. Morita, G.M. Chew, J.D. 
Barbour, E.F.O. Telan, M. Hirashima, T. Hattori, E. M. Dimaano: Galectin-9 Plasma Levels Reflect Adverse 
Hematological and Immunological Features in Acute Dengue Virus Infection, Journal of Clinical Virology, 
Vol.58, pp.635-640, 2013. 
Usuzawa, M., Telan, E.O., Kawano, R., Dizon, C.S., Alisjahabana, B., Ashino, Y., Egawa, S., Fukumoto, M., Izumi, 
T., Ono, Y. and Hattori, T.: Awareness of disaster reduction frameworks and risk perception of natural disaster: 
A questionnaire survey among the Philippines and Indonesian health care personnel and public health students. 










8. IRIDeS fact-finding mission, Disaster Recovery Team 
 
8.1 Data Acquisition and Field Survey in Cebu and Basey 
 
Group members 
1.  Prof. Osamu Murao (Team Leader, International Strategy for Disaster Mitigation) 
2.  Ass. Prof. Kazumasa Hanaoka (Technology for Urban Resuscitation)  




Typhoon Haiyan widely affected urban areas in Philippines. It damaged 1,140,332 houses as of January 14, 2014: 
550,928heavily, and 589,404 moderately (NDRRMC, 2014). 
IRIDeS organized a team for research on the post-disaster recovery support and sent them to the areas affected 
by the typhoon and tidal wave twice in January and February 2014. 
The purpose of the surveys was to obtain data, materials, and useful information for long-term post-disaster 




The authors, members of the post-disaster recovery research team, conducted two surveys in January and February 
in 2014. The following is the itinerary and a map showing the places visited (Fig.8-1). 
[Reconnaissance in January 2014] 
Sunday, January 19:  
21:30 Arrive in Manila 
Monday, January 20: 
-12:00 Interview, JICA Philippines Office 
-15:00 Survey of statistic data, National Statistics Office 
-18:00 Gathering materials and information 
Tuesday, January 21: 
-12:00 Gathering supportive information for field surveys 
-14:00 Meeting with travel agencies 
-16:00 Gathering materials and information 
-17:30 Survey of maps and geospatial data, National Mapping and Resource Information Authority 
Wednesday, January 22: 
09:45 Depart for Tokyo 
 
[Field Survey in February 2014] 
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Sunday, February 16:  
21:30 Arrive in Manila 
Monday, February 17: 
-11:00 Purchase of statistic data, National Statistics Office 
-13:00 Meeting with Social Housing Finance Corporation 
-14:00 Purchase of maps and geospatial data, National Mapping and Resource Information Authority 
17:00 Depart for Cebu  
18:15 Arrive in Cebu 
Tuesday, February 18: 
-15:30 Field survey in Medellin: Community-led Disaster Rehabilitation Project 
-16:00 Interview, Kawit Barangay Office 
-17:00 Interview, Municipality of Daanbantayan 
Wednesday, February 19: 
06:00 Depart for Tacloban 
06:40 Arrive in Tacloban 
-09:30 Visit to some damaged areas in Tacloban 
10:00 Arrive in Basey 
-17:00 Field Survey in Basey 
Thursday, February 20: 
-12:00 Interview, Municipality of Basey 
-15:30 Field Survey in Basey 
16:45 Depart for Manila 
18:00 Arrive in Manila 
19:30 Interview, JICA Philippines Office 
Friday, February 21: 
10:00 Depart for Tokyo 
 
Fig.8-1. Areas visited for Surveys. 
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8.1.3 Data Acquisition 
 
Spatial information and regional statistics are essential to understand the characteristics of affected areas and to 
conduct effective measures for recovery and reconstruction planning after calamities. Immediately after Typhoon 
Haiyan stroke the Philippines in November 2013, our team began to collect various spatial and statistical datasets 
available on the Internet. Thereafter, during our field surveys conducted in January and February 2014, we visited 
the National Statistics Office and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority in Manila, the 
Philippines, to negotiate about data provision. In this section, we will first provide an outline of spatial and 
statistical database we obtained. We will then analyze characteristics of areas affected by Typhoon Haiyan based on 
the datasets. 
 
We obtained the following datasets:  
 
Online free sources: Due to the pervasiveness of the internet and systems like Google Earth and OpenStreetMap, 
international collaborations about mapmaking were easily achieved. Through the accumulation of such individual 
and research institutions’ efforts (so-called volunteered geographic information), numerous datasets were created 
and disseminated. At the same time, several portal sites gathered such information and provided them through their 
websites. Spatial datasets ranging from administrative boundaries, roads, background imagery etc. to Typhoon 
Haiyan path, building footprints, damage assessment etc. were obtained. A list of useful web sites is presented 
below: 
 
・Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team 
URL http://hot.openstreetmap.org/projects/typhoon_haiyan 
・ArcGIS Online 
URL http://www.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=b5226c1f85954be0891b07ba43 b6e952 
・Project NOAH(Nationwide Operational Assessment of Hazards) 
URL http://noah.dost.gov.ph/ 
・Typhoon Yolanda Geonode 
URL http://www.yolandadata.org/ 
・PhilGIS (Philippine GIS Data Clearinghouse) 
URL http://www.philgis.org/freegisdata.htm 
・Copernicus Emergency Management Service EMSR058 
URL http://emergency.copernicus.eu/ 
 
Situation Report on the Effects of Typhoon Yolanda: The National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council 





-for-typhoon-qyolandaq&catid=1%3Andrrmc-update&Itemid=1). While contents of the reports differ slightly, they 
usually contain an updated list of victims and their characteristics such as age, sex, municipality and cause of 
death/injury. They also have statistical tables about human and housing damage and,and humanitarian assistance. 
We converted the list of victims and selected statistical tables to Excel format to link with our spatial databases in 
ArcGIS. 
 
Census of Population and Housing 2000 and 2010 (CPH2000, CPH2010): The National Statistics Office (NSO) 
conducts the Census of Population and Housing every five years. The latest survey was conducted in May 2010 and 
already published. CPH 2010 consists of several forms. Of them, CPH Form 2 was distributed to all persons and 
households in the Philippines (i.e. a complete survey). We contacted the NSO about data provision in January and 
February 2014 and they appreciated the purposes of our data use and kindly provided CPH 2000 and 2010. 
Specialized software (CS Pro) for census operation was used to assist data manipulation, tabulation and export. 
 
CPH Form 2 contains questions about both demographic attributes such as age, sex, and education level of 
household members and housing attributes such as type of building and construction materials of houses in which 
people reside. Since a large number of houses along the coast were washed away by the storm surge, we cannot 
survey construction materials from fieldwork and satellite imagery in same detail as from the census. CPH 2010 is 
the only data source to understand housing characteristics of affected areas before Typhoon Haiyan. We therefore 
tabulated the dataset by a selected demographic or housing variable and municipality to create thematic maps. 
 
Datakit of Official Philippine Statistics (DATOS): DATOS is a collection of various statistics at barangay and 
municipality level. It contains information of (1) the number of facilities (hall, hospital, school, telephone, electric 
power etc.) at barangay level, (2) the number of establishments by types at the municipality level and (3) official 
population counts for 1980, 1990, 1995 and 2000. DATOS also includes ESRI Shapefiles of provincial and 
municipality, barangay boundaries for mapping datasets in DATOS as well as tables tabulated from CPH 2010. 
 
Large scale urban maps of Tacloban and Ormoc (Fig.8-2): The National Mapping and Resource Information 
Authority (NAMRIA) published different types of maps. Large scale maps are however limited to large cities and 
they have not been updated frequently. CAD maps for Tacloban and Ormoc cities were fortunately available 
although they were last updated in the late 1990s. These CAD maps were converted to ESRI Shapefiles to overlay 
them with other maps. The maps contain shapes of buildings, elevation, roads, vegetation, etc. These large scale 





Fig.8-2. A large scale urban GIS map of Tacloban. 
 
Analysis based on datasets we obtained: 
 
By using situation reports on the effects of Typhoon Haiyan by NDDRMC, spatial distributions of housing and 
population suffered from Typhoon Haiyan are mapped in Fig.8-3 and Fig.8-4. 
 
 





Fig.8-4. The number of houses damaged by Typhoon Haiyan (Source: NDRRMC Situation Report). 
 
According to Fig.8-3, a large number of the dead were mainly concentrated in municipalities around Tacloban City 
where an extremely high storm surge and strong wind speed were recorded. On the other hand, the number of 
houses damaged is larger not only around Tacloban City but also in municipalities along the storm track. Inland 
municipalities also had housing damages possibly because strong wind destroyed rural houses constructed by light 
weight natural materials (Fig.8-5).  
 




In order to understand characteristics of the dead, we first tabulated counts by sex or age categories of victims and 
then estimated the total counts of the dead and injured per 10,000 people (Fig.8-6) based on population in CPH 
2010. Our initial survey revealed males and the elderly are more likely to have suffered from Typhoon Haiyan. In 
particular, people aged 70 years old and over are ten times more likely to be killed. 
 
Fig.8-6. The number of the dead and injured by sex and age category (adjusted). 
 
We experimentally applied text mining to words used to describe causes of death or injury in the list of victims for 
estimating possible causalities. Fig.8-7 presents co-occurrence of words after excluding “previously reported 
unidentified”. Ranked by the number of times they appeared in the list, words are classified into three groups. The 
first group relates to “drown” (including “drowning”) which suggests that people were killed by storm surge. The 
second group includes words like “cardiac” and “arrest”, which also suggest an association with “drown” to some 
extent. The third group contains “tree”, “debris”, “hit”, “fallen” and “toppled”. Since these words were used 
concurrently, many people were possibly killed by collision caused by strong wind. On the other hand, “wound” 
(including “wounded”), “punctured” and “lacerated” appeared often with words relating to human body parts. 
These co-occurrences imply that people became injured during their evacuation.  
 
          
            causes of death     causes of injuries 
*Size of circle represents the number of times a word appeared in the list. 
 




8.1.4 Field Survey in Basey 
 
(1) Outline of the survey 
The municipality of Basey is located in Samar Island, northeast of Tacloban.  According to material obtained in 
the field survey, Typhoon Haiyan caused 235 casualties including missing people, injured 714 people, and affected 
15,583 families and 50,423 people in the municipality. The number of heavily damaged buildings is 7,175 and 
moderately damaged is 5,048. 
The post-disaster recovery research team carried out a field survey to record the building damage conditions in 
Basey (Fig.8-8) in February for long-term post-disaster urban recovery monitoring.  The team visited the 
Municipality Office to get information on the regional damage in order to understand the data obtained by the 
survey. We also interviewed people living in the coastal areas and in temporary housing who were affected by the 
typhoon. 
 
Fig. 8-8. Map of Basey used for the Field Survey. 
 
(2) Record of building damage conditions 
The building damage recording method the team applied in the survey was as follows. 
At first, we defined the boundary of objective areas that were affected by the typhoon and determined the driving 
route based on the map (Fig.8-8). Then we took a record of all buildings in the area with GPS driving recorder on a 
car. The building damage conditions are classified into four categories: completely damaged, heavily damaged, 




   
Fig. 8-9. Damaged and rebuilt buildings in Basey. 
 
(3) Recovery conditions as of February 2014 
As well as recording the damage condition, the team visited the Municipality of Basey and interviewed the 
Municipal Mayor, staff in the City Planning Department, and victims to understand recovery conditions and 
problems they were facing (Fig.8-10). 
One of the significant problems for affected residents living in coastal areas was landownership. The government 
stated that they would adopt building regulations in the coastal zone within 40m from the coastline. This would 
influence the recovery situation of the residents and their resettlement 
Another problem for the victims was the criteria to live in a temporary house such as the number of children they 
have. There is a temporary housing area on the outskirts of the town (Fig.8-8) and the floor area of each house is 
about 6 m2. Some people who lost their houses had to keep living in a damaged area because they did not meet the 
criteria. 
The recovery plan was under consideration when the survey was conducted. 
 
   





8.1.5 Field Survey in Cebu 
 
(1) Outline of the survey and building damage conditions 
The north of Cebu is non-tourism development zone as compared with other areas in Cebu island. According to 
NDRRMC report (2014), the number of damaged houses remained at 24,373 houses (18,752 completely / 5,621 
slightly) and 8 persons were killed in the north of Cebu (the total in Municipalities Daanbantayan and Medellin) by 
typhoon Haiyan. When we conducted a field survey in February 2014, we found collapsed buildings everywhere 
(Fig.8-11, 8-12). Our team conducted interviews focusing on how to provide recovery support for victims by NGO 
and the local government in Barangay Kawit (Fig.8-13). 
 
   
Fig.8-11. Completely damaged buildings in Barangay Kawit, Cebu. Basketball gymnasium (left) and privately 
owned building (Right). 
 
   




Fig.8-13. Field survey area in Cebu. 
 
(2) Recovery conditions as of February 2014 
This time, the affected area in Cebu conducted self-reconstruction by victims. In addition, NGOs provided 
temporary employment and housing reconstruction support, and local governments of Cebu provided food supply 
assistance. However, we could not confirm financial assistance, localized recovery, or reconstruction plans for the 
affected areas in Cebu by the government.  
 
(3) Support activity by NGO 
In Barangay Kawit in Cebu, we contacted NGO staff (Joint team of Lihok Filipina Foundation, Pagtambayayong 
Foundation and PhilDHRRA) to inquire about support for the victims. They were providing temporary employment 
support (clean up the shack, Php300.00/day), housing support (construction of starter houses, Php8,000.00/unit and 
repair of housing units, Php4,000.00/unit) and others (Fig.8-14) for the victims. In addition, the standard of support 
that should be provided for the victims was determined by DSWD (Department of Social Welfare and 




Fig.8-14. Support for victims by NGO in Barangay Kawit, Cebu. 
 
Temporary houses (starter houses provided by NGO) were located in the area 200m away from the coast. The 
houses were composed of simple structures such as wooden frameworks, tin roof and walls, and the material used 
were blue tarpaulin, wooden board and bamboo fence etc (Fig.8-15). To conduct this project, NGO faced two 
problems: how to provide clean water, and how to collect the fund and materials since Philippine Government 















Fig.8-15. Temporary houses (starter houses provided by an NGO) in Barangay Kawit, Cebu. 
 
(4) Support activity by Government 
According to Barangay officers in Kawit, they provided food support for the victims, but they did not establish a 
housing support system by the government. Therefore, they needed to depend on NGOs for the main part of 
housing reconstruction assistance.  
Community-Led Disaster Rehabilitation Project (Barangay Kawit, Medellin, Cebu) 
Project Duration: December 2013 – April 2014 
 
Project Components 
Employment Generation & Livelihood (Cash for Work) 
Php 300.00/day inclusive of 3 months SSS and 1 year Insurance 
Construction of Starter Houses @Php8,000.00/unit 
Repair of Housing Units @Php4,000.00/unit 
Construction of Communal Toilet & Bath @Php60,000.00/unit 
Provision of Hygiene Kit @Php50,000.00/Toilet 
Information and Education Inputs/Activities 
Psychosocial activities and support 
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 To start recovery process, the Philippine Government decided to set “no-build zone” in the Recovery Plan (2013) 
in order to prohibit housing construction within 40m from the coast and ensure safety for residents. However, the 
residential area has already existed in the coastal area in Kawit before Typhoon Haiyan. The Barangay Captain tried 
to encourage residences to move inland, but it was not so effective for them. Therefore, barangay officers think it is 








































1.  Prof. David Alexander (UCL-IRDR) 
2.  Dr. Joanna Faure Walker (UCL-IRDR) 
3.  Mr. Joshua Macabuag (UCL-EPICentre) 
4.  Assoc. Prof. Anawat Suppasri (Earthquake induced Tsunami Risk Evaluation, IRIDeS) 
 
8.2.1 Collaboration between UCL-IRDR and Tohoku University IRIDeS 
 
The field mission to the Philippines to assess post-disaster recovery was part of an ongoing collaboration between 
University College London Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction (UCL-IRDR) and Tohoku University 
International Research Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS). It was planned following a symposium on disasters 
held by UCL-IRDR and IRIDeS in London during November 2013. Prior to that, a UK-Japan workshop on disaster 
risk reduction entitled “Learning from the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake” took place in Tokyo during October 
2012 (Faure Walker et al. 2013). UCL-IRDR, UCL EPICentre, and IRIDeS members also collaborated as part of 
the EEFIT team which assessed the recovery process two years after the 2011 Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and 
Tsunami (EEFIT 2013). The text in this chapter is included within the IRDR Special Report 2014-01 “The 
post-disaster phase of transitional settlement: A perspective from typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) in eastern Philippines”. 
 
8.2.2 Mission Aim 
 
The aim of this field mission was to compare the effects of domestic and imported aid and assistance on the quality 
and speed of recovery. Another aim was to assess vulnerability during the transitional phase between the initial 
emergency and long-term recovery and reconstruction. The mission focused on households and the physical 
structures in which they live. It also considered socio-economic influences upon resilience and the role of insurance 
in reducing the impact or increasing the rate of recovery. Specifically, the team carried out systematic surveys of the 
quality of building repairs and reconstruction processes in conjunction with questionnaire surveys of the 
householders who inhabited the structures. In addition, key professional personnel were interviewed. 
 
8.2.3 Survey Methods 
 
A brief fieldwork campaign was conducted during March 2014, four months after the typhoon. Some 160 
households were surveyed in 12 coastal Barangays (districts) of Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan in the province of 
Leyte, a part of the Philippine region of Eastern Visayas. According to 2010 census data, the survey covered about 
2, 5 and 5 per cent of the population of these municipalities, respectively. The questionnaires were accompanied by 
a structural engineering survey of respondents’ living quarters, which helped verify statements made about the 
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processes of building shelter and established the quality of the shelters in terms of resistance to future typhoons. 
 
 
Fig.8-16. Prof. David Alexander and Dr. Joanna Faure Walker interviewing a resident in Tanauan. 
 
 





8.2.4 Need for Research on the Post-Disaster Transitional Phase 
 
Research into risk and disaster reduction and post-disaster recovery is often focused on either the immediate 
emergency response phase or the long-term permanent recovery phase. Much less studied is the transitional phase, 
which begins when immediate relief winds down and continues into the start of permanent reconstruction. Some 
authors (e.g. Omidvar and Binesh 2012) have argued that there should be a direct passage from early recovery to 
final reconstruction, with the elimination of the transitional phase. Others (e.g. Alexander 2013) have probed the 
ways in which transition can become consolidated and institutionalised such that it reduces the impetus for full 
reconstruction. Meanwhile, evidence is mounting that attempts to shorten the duration of the transition between 
emergency response and full-scale reconstruction may involve skimping on design and consultation processes. As a 




Regarding the emergency phase of the typhoon disaster, we were interested in assessing the effectiveness of 
warning messages and evacuation procedures, as well as that of aid and assistance. With regard to the families that 
lived in the path of the storm, we examined how socio-economic status affected recovery, and the extent to which 
employment suffered. We enquired into the means by which shelter was provided and constructed, and evaluated its 
effectiveness and safety in the face of continuing natural hazards. We were particularly interested to find out 
whether families had received expert help when shelter was reconstructed, and, if so, what impact this may have 
had on the safety of transitional dwellings. We also looked into the security and tenure of families, especially in the 
light of the Philippine Government's declaration of a 'no-build' (i.e. set-back) zone that will stretch 40 metres inland 
from the shore. Finally, we asked what future prospects families envisaged after their homes had been severely 
damaged or destroyed by the typhoon. 
Various secondary questions arose from our survey work in the barangays. Was expertise on natural hazard 
resistance being utilised in the construction industry in order to make temporary shelters safe against wind and 
water damage during typhoons? What was the level of uptake of hazard insurance and what was the degree of 
interest in insurance (or possibly micro-insurance) schemes that cover typhoon damage? As judged by the 
recipients of aid, did the Government and NGO relief agencies perform well during the early stages of the disaster? 
How well did they succeed in providing assistance to the needy and stabilizing the situation at the local level? 
What is the relationship between transitional settlement (in particular, transitional shelter), long-term 
reconstruction and overall economic and human development? Did the transitional situation offer any clues 
regarding the outcomes in the longer term? In the areas we studied, are opportunities for development and 
vulnerability reduction being taken or ignored? In other words, does the ongoing process of recovery in the 





8.2.6 Key Findings and Recommendations 
 
Our findings relate to a variety of elements of the situation. The first of these is evacuation prior to the arrival of 
Typhoon Haiyan. The standard practice was for evacuation warnings to be disseminated to individual households 
by Barangay leaders. Almost two thirds of households that participated in the survey evacuated either the whole 
family or most of its members before the typhoon arrived, while 8 per cent evacuated during the typhoon and 28 
per cent remained in situ. Fewer of the families that remained suffered major damage to their properties that did 
those who evacuated, which suggests that the former anticipated lower risks by not evacuating. Of the families that 
evacuated, 55 per cent evacuated all members, 32 per cent left some men behind, 1 per cent evacuated children 
while leaving the parents behind and 12 per cent did not specify exactly who in the household left. Where men 
remained, the principal reason appears to have been the desire to guard property. Of 37 families in which men 
remained behind but women did not, we were able to verify that 13 (more than one third) suffered fatalities as a 
result. Overall, warnings successfully reached the majority of the people we interviewed. However, in many cases 
families underestimated the severity of the storm surge. Hence, the dissemination of warnings was effective, but the 
content less so. 
The distribution of money and basic goods is one crucial aspect of the bridge between the emergency phase, in 
which mere survival is the objective, and the transitional phase, in which families must start to consider how they 
are going to recover in the long term. Studies show (Middleton and O'Keefe 1998) that the assistance people 
receive must help them recover rather than destroying local coping mechanisms (including local markets and 
businesses) and inducing aid-dependency. We found that almost all agencies working in the Tacloban area had 
furnished only minimal aid to the respondents of our survey. The Philippine Government provided basic foodstuffs, 
while INGOs gave hygiene kits and cooking utensils. Limited cash-for-work schemes were operated over a brief 
period. Over a period of two months, one INGO, acting independently of the others and of the Government, 
distributed cash to families. The grant varied from US$175-350 according to family size. Many of our respondents 
received it. Cash distributions are the subject of varied opinions in the literature (cf. Mattinen and Ogden 2006, 
Willibald 2006). Cash hand-outs may encourage corruption and heighten security risks. We found no evidence of 
these problems and instead that cash was highly beneficial in enabling people to buy building materials, subsistence 
foods, goods to sell in a small business or items such as fishing boats or rickshaws. However, like Mattinen and 
Ogden (2006), we also found that the influx of cash stimulated inflation in the price of building materials, which 
increased by between 20 and 100 per cent with respect to what it was before the typhoon. However, some of the 
increase can be attributed to a shortage of sawmill capacity. It would have helped if the Philippine Government and 
local authorities have endeavoured to control prices. 
The Philippine Government has decreed that an area that stretches 40 metres inland from the current coastline 
will be designated as a no-build zone (known in other parts of the world as a ‘set-back line’), in which 
reconstruction will be prohibited and from which existing settlement will eventually be relocated. Local 
governments have been given the option to adopt or reject this measure. We found that 94 per cent of interviewees 
knew where the no-build zones were, and hence we conclude that the system of using large signs to indicate the 
no-build zones has been effective. However, despite its ease of communication, we question whether the 40m 
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no-build zone policy is unreasonably simplistic. It does not reflect variations in hazard level with topography and 
may therefore lead to the underestimation of the risk in some places and its overestimation, leading to unnecessary 
relocation, in others. 
The survey found that 99 per cent of householders interviewed did not have property insurance, which is 
consistent with national penetration rates of barely 1 per cent (de la Cruz Tendero 2013). Of those interviewees who 
lacked insurance, 34 per cent stated they would like it in the future, 20 per cent said it was too expensive and 38 per 
cent were unable to decide because they lacked basic information on the topic. Hence, we recommend that 
insurance companies and local government work to educate the population of high-hazard areas about whichever 
insurance options are available. Furthermore, we encourage those who are investigating alternative low-cost 
insurance options (possibly micro-insurance) to continue their work. 
We were interested in the pace of temporary and permanent reconstruction. At the time of the survey, March 
2014 (four months after the typhoon), 99 per cent of respondents had started temporary reconstruction, but 87 per 
cent had not begun the process of reconstructing their accommodation permanently. Half of the latter cited lack of 
money as the reason. Given the choice, 79 per cent of interviewees would reconstruct in situ, and this proportion 
rises to 90 per cent when one considers only households located outside the ‘no-build zones.’ More than half of the 
dwellings that we examined were built without the aid of professional advice or help. In very many cases, 
householders built their own transitional shelter, possibly with the aid of a local carpenter, whose qualifications and 
skills were probably minimal. 
Those respondents who were awaiting relocation had little or no idea about to where they would be relocating or 
when it would happen. In terms of the demand for housing, the production of temporary shelters and the inability to 
start permanent reconstruction made the transitional phase of recovery inevitable, whether or not it was desirable in 
terms of the pathway to a stable, permanent reconstruction. It would have been helpful if local governments could 
have given householders more information about their plans for relocating them. 
 





The survey was particularly concerned with the quality of reconstruction. We found that shelter built by 
householders without the aid of training or expert advice led to the proliferation of structures that are vulnerable to 
typhoons and storm surges, possibly also tsunamis, which could happen during the life of such structures. 
Philippine and international NGOs had formulated advice on good construction practice, but we found that it did 
not reach the householders that we interviewed. Even those dwellings that were built by carpenters with some 
experience in the construction industry lacked basic measures to ensure safety and robustness. Hence, in relation to 
the risk of future natural hazards, communities did not appear to be “building back better.” 
In general, the dwellings we surveyed lacked bracing to ensure lateral stability and tended to have foundations 
that were too shallow. Connections between roofs and frames were inadequate and steel sheets used as roofing 
material had little to restrain them against high winds. Regarding timber frames, structural members had inadequate 
connections, and the sizes of timber used tended to be inadequate and inconsistent, especially where the lumber was 
salvaged from the post-typhoon wreckage. 
Reinforced concrete suffered from poor compaction, over-sized aggregate, inadequate rebar cover, the use of 
smooth steel bars (however, mainly in older constructions) and an excessively sparing use of reinforcement. Where 
cinder-blocks were used as a construction material, they tended to be low quality and hence weak. Walls were too 
thin and few ties existed between blocks and vertical posts. 
As structures that were near to each other tended to be built using similar construction techniques, it seems that 
both defects and strengths were disseminated locally in either active or passive mode. The Philippine Technical 
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) runs training schemes in the form of short courses on key 
skills. It is intended that those who attend the courses will pass the knowledge on to others in their barangays. 
Unfortunately, the householders we interviewed did not seem to be aware of these programmes. 
Training programmes are needed in the early stages of the transitional recovery phase. In this respect, the 
TESDA programmes are promising, but they need to be more numerous and more widely accessible to 
beneficiaries. Community-level awareness programmes involving posters and local talks can be used to 
demonstrate basic principles and essential details of construction. They should be used to ensure that householders 
understand bracing for stability, frame connections (e.g. using more one nail per connection) and roof connections 
(abundant use of hurricane straps and better securing of the elements of roofs). Those authorities who commission 
reconstruction programmes need to be given presentations and other forms of awareness programmes. They include 
councillors and other community representatives, municipal staff and NGO operatives who are responsible for 
recovery and reconstruction processes. 
More detailed training is needed for those people who are professionals in the construction trade, as they can be 
expected to put the lessons directly into practice and retain the knowledge in their future work. Training for all 
professional people in the construction trades is an unrealistic goal because it would be too expensive. However, 
with careful management, a ‘cascade system’ can be used in conjunction with a construction programme that uses 
the “supervised self-build” model. “Training of trainers” can include mentoring processes, transfer of skills and the 
consequent dissemination of expertise. Examples of appropriate schemes are given in Macabuag (2010) and 
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The transition between emergency assistance and permanent recovery is a critical phase (Leon et al. 2009). It can 
determine the course of reconstruction and recovery, and contribute much to its eventual success or failure. During 
this period, survivors can be either lifted out of poverty and destitution, and protected against further hazard 
impacts, or left to languish in a state of perennial vulnerability. 
Our survey showed some positive aspects of the emergency phase, particularly in the dissemination of warnings 
and decision to evacuate. Not all evacuation ended in success, in that the storm surge was high enough to 
overwhelm places such as the Tacloban Convention Centre, in which many families were sheltering. Transitional 
shelter was mostly erected over a period of three months, during which many people lived in precarious, makeshift 
conditions. Some continued to live in tents four months after the event, but repair of local infrastructure and 
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provision of basic housing were moving ahead. 
Our main finding is that, among the people and families we interviewed, natural hazard vulnerability was 
reproduced during the transitional phase, while employment stagnated and long-term prospects were, for many 
interviewees, unfathomable. Hence, an opportunity to create safety and the conditions for a “bounce-forward” 
recovery essentially lost, or at least deferred until an unpredictable future. 
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8.3 Path to “Build Back Better”: involvement of local stakeholders in future disaster risk reduction and 
planning recovery and implementation 
 
Group members 
1.  Assoc. Prof. Takako Izumi (International Regional Cooperation Office) 
2.  Assoc. Prof. Kanako Iuchi (Comparative Mitigation Society)  
3.  Assoc. Prof. Michimasa Matsumoto (International Regional Cooperation Office) 
 
Objectives  
The focuses of the major interests by the participated researchers in this mission are social science, community 
resilience, post-disaster planning and policies as well as role of local stakeholders in disaster risk reduction (DRR). 
This field mission aims to learn: i) how are governments (both national and locals), Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs), private sectors and communities had prepared against disasters in the past, responded as well as been 
recovered after Typhoon Yolanda; and ii) what are the emerging issues in recovery, in particular on resettlement and 
livelihood rebuilding practices. This trip occurred between March 4th and 13th, 2014. 
 
Activities 
The team visited Manila, Tacloban and Ormoc on 4-13 March 2014. The research was conducted mainly based on a 
series of meetings and interviews with government officers, CSOs, private sector representatives, and community 
leaders. The list of the interviewees include: the Center for Disaster Preparedness (CDP), Corporate Network for 
Disaster Response (CNDR), Asian Disaster Reduction and Response Network (ADRRN), the Eastern Visaya 
Network, Help Direct Initiative, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), 
Office of Civil Defense (OCD), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Philippine Institute of 
Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), SRDP, Oriental Consultants, United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), Office of the Presidential Assistant for Recovery and Rehabilitation (PARR), City Government of 
Tacloban, City Government of Ormoc, Tacloban City Councilor, Barangay leaders from Barangay Uban, Barangay 
68, Barangay 64, Barangay 59-B, Barangay 88, Barangay 31, and Barangay 61 in Tacloban, and the Barangay Luna, 
Guintigui-an, Quezon. Jr, Linac, Valencia, Bagong, San Antonio, and Can-untog in Ormoc.    
   
8.3.1 Challenges and opportunities in involvement and contribution of local stakeholders (LGUs, civil society 
organizations, private sectors etc.) in disaster response and recovery 
 
8.3.1.1 Future disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategy in the Philippines: strengthening the DRR capacity of local 
government units (LGUs) 
 
The Philippines Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) Act or the Republic Act No. 10121 was 
enacted in 2010 in order to strengthen the country’s institutional capacity for DRR and management and to build 
the resilience of local communities to disasters including climate change impacts. Under this Act, provinces, cities 
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and municipalities have a greater responsibility in building the disaster resilience of communities, and in 
institutionalizing DRR within their functions and operations (EMI, 2010). The Act made a paradigm shift possible 
in the disaster management strategy in the Philippines from the focus on emergency relief (post-disaster) to DRR 
(pre-disaster). This puts more emphasis on strengthening people’s capacity to absorb stress, maintain basic 
functions during a disaster and bounce back better from disasters (DRRNetPhils, 2010).   
The major characteristics of the Act are highlighted as the policy that emphasizes the needs and importance of: 
 promoting involvement and participation of all sectors and all stakeholders concerned at all levels especially 
the local community,  
 strengthening the capacity of the national government as well as the local government units (LGUs),  
 mainstreaming DRR and climate change in development processes,  
 recognizing and strengthening the capacity of LGUs and communities in DRR, response and recovery, and  
 engaging the participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) and the private sector..   
In addition, the Act transformed the then National Disaster Coordinating Council to the National Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) and included representatives from CSOs and the private sector in 
the Council. Under the NDRRMC, the Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (RDRRMCs) 
and the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (LDRRMCs) were established in order to monitor 
and implement the action plans and ensure the integration of DRR and climate change adaptation into local 
development plans, programs, and budgets. Concerning the fund allocation for DRR and management, not less than 
5% of the estimated revenue from regular sources is set aside as the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Fund (LDRRMF) to support disaster risk management activities including post-disaster activities. Of 
the amount for LDRRMF, 30% is allocated as the quick response fund and 70% is allocated for DRR purposes. 
Furthermore, the Act encourages integrating DRR and management education in the school curricula of secondary 
and tertiary level of education whether private or public, including formal and non-formal, technical–vocational, 
indigenous learning and out-of-school youth courses and programs.  
While the enactment of the Act became an important chapter of the disaster management history of the 
Philippines and demonstrated that the Philippines has fully committed to the enhancement of the DRR capacity and 
its implementation both at national and local levels, the question of the progress and extent of the implementation 
of the Act still remains 3 years after its enactment. In the interview with the municipality in Tacloban and Ormoc as 
well as a national CSO in the Philippines, gaps were addressed in the preparedness and response capacity of cities 
and barangays.  
City Disaster Risk Reduction Management Offices (CDRRMO) were established in both Tacloban and Ormoc 
and played an important role in emergency relief when typhoon Haiyan struck these cities. In Tacloban, according 
to the CDRRMO officer, the hazard maps to prepare for tsunamis and storm hazards were distributed and the 
stockpile of relief items was prepared prior to typhoon Haiyan. The contingency and disaster response plan existed. 
However, the resources that the city possessed, such as equipment needed for the search and rescue activities were 
not sufficient, and at the same time, most of them were washed away. A certain time was required for assistance 
from the national and international levels to arrive. Furthermore, in the interview of the Barangay leaders, all of 
them emphasized that they did not have sufficient knowledge to understand what the storm surge was and the fact 
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that they needed to evacuate immediately.  
In Ormoc, due to their former experience of the flash flood in 1991, their understanding and knowledge on 
disaster preparedness was high. The direct damage and impacts were also less compared to the ones in Tacloban. 
The response activities were undertaken in close collaboration with the LGUs, the private sectors, and the 
communities. Even at the Barangay level, the preparedness training and evacuation drills were provided prior to the 
typhoon Haiyan. It showed that the past experience of disasters can be a crucial element of awareness raising on 
DRR.  
In the Act, the CDRRMO is provided three staff for 1) administrative and training, 2) research and planning, 
and 3) operations and warning. One of the national CSOs in the Philippines commented that the current capacity of 
the CDRRMOs was not sufficient in order to conduct thorough programs and tasks for disaster preparedness. 
Therefore, while 90% of the municipalities established CDRRMOs, most of them are not yet fully operational. 
Further support to the LGUs for their capacity development of DRR is urgently needed. The collaboration and joint 
activities/programs with the CSOs and the LGUs may be one of the possibilities to explore in the future. 
 
8.3.1.2 Involvement and participation of new local stakeholders in disaster response and DRR 
 
National and Local Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 
A number of international organizations were actively involved in disaster response activities after this typhoon. In 
addition, the roles of the national and local CSOs in the Philippines in the disaster response should not be 
overlooked. In most cases of disaster response to a large-scale disaster ,international organizations and agencies 
from outside the affected countries play a key role in the disaster response, however, the coordination and 
collaboration with national and local CSOs are often neglected although national and local CSOs have long-term 
experience working with the community for many years and understand the risks, issues and conditions at the local 
level. As a result, in many cases, the internationally provided assistance does not take into consideration the local 
culture and practices and does not have a long-term perspective and emphasis on sustainability. In addition it leads 
to a disaster response that does not reflect the actual needs of the communities and causes the delay of the overall 
response and recovery efforts. The participatory approach is crucial in the effective disaster response and recovery 
by encouraging the involvement of various local stakeholders. 
In order to reduce the gaps in the needs of the communities and the assistance provided internationally, a CSO 
network in the Philippines took the lead for coordination between international organizations and national/local 
organizations during the response to typhoon Haiyan. The Eastern Visayas Network is a CSO network that includes 
various groups of women, farmers, elderly, youth organizations and multi-sectoral organization and consists of 
more than 30 organizations. The major objective of the network is capacity development of the member 
organizations regarding law, human rights, local development planning, project monitoring, budget management etc. 
In case of the Haiyan response, the Network played a role especially in information sharing about community needs 
and logistical conditions and in providing suggestions for the ways of assistance based on local culture and tradition 
according to the Executive Director of the Eastern Visayas Network. In addition, the Network shared the 
information and contacts of the national and local organizations with specific focuses and encouraged international 
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organizations to work and collaborate with them.  
Such national and local CSOs network was also supported by a regional CSO network called the Asian Disaster 
Reduction and Response Network (ADRRN). ADRRN consists of nearly 50 CSOs from 20 countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region. ADRRN has an experience of providing coordination between international organizations and 
national and local CSOs in other countries. ADRRN sent the assessment team to the Philippines after the typhoon 
Haiyan to conduct a needs assessment and analysis in coordination among national and local CSOs, governments 
and international organizations. The result of the assessment shared by the ADRRN Program Officer who joined the 
assessment team addressed the gaps in limited cultural sensitivity, lack of information sharing, fragmentation of 
coordination mechanism, and weak participation of local stakeholders in the coordination mechanism. Based on 
these findings, ADRRN proposed to establish a resource/coordination center for the national and local NGOs. 
These resource centers were temporally established in Cebu, Ormoc, Tacloban, Roxas and Guiuan. The Eastern 
Visayas Network managed the resource center in Tacloban. The major contributions of the resource centers include 
information sharing, capacity development of CSOs, strengthening horizontal coordination between international, 
national and local organizations. They also contributed to establishing an effective coordination system for 
emergency response and recovery based on local leadership. In case of the disaster response to the typhoon Haiyan, 
these centers can be identified as an attempt at a new type of collaboration in the Philippines between the 
international organizations and the national and local CSOs, and it encouraged the implementation of disaster 
response and recovery based on a participatory approach.                       
 
Private sector 
The private sector has been also involved in disaster response to Typhoon Haiyan very actively. In Ormoc, the local 
business sector played a crucial role to distribute relief items and provide volunteers, and their contributions were 
acknowledged by the Mayor and Municipality. The positive aspects of the involvement of the local business sector 
are that they could respond to the disaster very quickly and distribute relief items that were most needed as they are 
also a part of the community and easily understand the actual needs. If the relief goods are mobilized locally, there 
is no need to wait to receive any assistance from outside. This type of preparation and contribution by the local 
business sector can be a good practice especially in case of a small and medium scale disasters.   
In the Philippines, the initiatives of the private sector in disaster response have been seen from the 1990’s. The 
Corporate Network for Disaster Response (CNDR) is a network of corporations, business associations and 
corporate foundations, whose objective is to help improve disaster management efforts of the business sector before, 
during and after disasters. CNDR has more than 50 members in the corporate sector and many of them contributed 
to the emergency response in the case of Typhoon Haiyan by distributing relief items. The disaster response has 
been their key activity so far, however, the situation is slightly changing gradually from disaster response oriented 
to disaster risk management. According to the Program Officer, CNDR has initiated community-based disaster risk 
management projects and the business continuity management programs as well as capacity development projects 
for the local governments. The CNDR secretariat provides corporate sector members with the necessary technical 
assistance for project planning and implementation. CNDR launched the capacity development program for the 
local government in Cebu in March 2014 with the funding support from the CNDR members. The way of support 
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by the private sectors is also becoming diverse not only for the disaster response.  
In Tacloban, the Global Media Arts Network (GMA Network) provided great assistance in the housing 
construction project in the recovery stage (Fig. 8-19). 
 
  
Fig. 8-19. Signboard set at the housing construction site in Tacloban and the construction site. 
 
8.3.1.3 Importance of capacity development of local stakeholders 
 
CSOs, LGUs, and private sectors 
The implementation of the DRRM Act is a key for DRR and disaster risk management in the Philippines. Mainly 
two things need to be considered: a) how to develop the capacity of LGUs as well as other local stakeholders and b) 
how to motivate local stakeholders such as those from the private sector and CSOs to be involved in disaster 
management issues more actively, preferably DRR efforts. This is not an issue only in the Philippines. Even other 
disaster prone countries in Asia such as Indonesia have been facing the same challenges. In this research, the 
initiatives to assist the CSOs and the LGUs have been already identified. ADRRN and other CSOs network from 
the Philippines such as the Eastern Visaya Network initiated a project of capacity development of national and local 
CSOs in DRR. CNDR, which is a network in the corporate sector conducted workshops in Cebu to train the LGUs 
in DRR especially on project planning and implementation of community based programs. More importantly, these 
collaboration and joint activities among various stakeholders need to be systematic and sustainable. However, the 
sustainability can be one of the most challenging factors for the local stakeholders as their resources are often 
limited. Ideally, the assistance from the international community and the national government should be spent for 
these capacity development programs to build the community resilience. Once the LGUs and the CSOs developed 
their capacity in DRR, the knowledge can cascade down to the communities, and the communities themselves are 
equipped by the knowledge and skills to take action by themselves in case of a future disaster.    
 
Communities 
In an interview with one of the Barangay leaders in Tacloban (Fig. 8-20), he emphasized the importance of the 
DRR training opportunities for Barangay leaders. He attended the training seminar on DRR that targeted the LGU 
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officials and the Barangay (village) leaders prior to Typhoon Haiyan. 25 Balangay/municipal leaders were invited 
to this seminar, and 17 Barangay and municipalities sent participants. The training was planned and organized by 
the LGUs and they requested support from the national government for sending the trainers who had the knowledge 
and skills of DRR strategy to the program. The LGUs also mobilized the funding for the training by themselves. 
According to one of the Barangay leaders who participated in the training, due to the knowledge that he gained 
from the workshop, he was able to issue an evacuation order immediately after the warning to the communities as 
he deeply understood what the storm surge was, its risk, and the importance of the evacuation. At the result, there 
were no casualties from the village, although 167 out of 267 houses were damaged. It proved how important 
capacity development is, especially in the leaders as they also have the responsibility for the safety and security of 
the community members.  
 
 
Fig. 8-20. Interview with one of the village leaders in Tacloban. 
 
The village also had another DRR initiative by planting mangroves near the coast after Typhoon Haiyan. It was 
their local knowledge that the mangrove plantation could reduce the potential risks caused by a tsunami and storm 
surge. This time, although most of the mangrove was damaged by Typhoon Haiyan (Fig. 8-21), the impact was  
minimum as the mangrove became a buffer against the typhoon. The community members replanted the mangrove 





Fig. 8-21. Damaged mangroves by the typhoon in the Barangay Uban. 
 
 
Fig. 8-22. The mangroves were replanted by the community members. 
 
However, there is a challenge to maintain the capacity of the LGUs and the Barangay leaders in DRR. The 
turnover of the LGU staff is very high and even the Barangay leaders have fixed terms, therefore, the capacity of 
the LGU staff cannot be stable and sustainable. In order to overcome this particular challenge, regular trainings for 
the LGUs and the Barangay leaders need to be organized systematically with the funding support by the national 
government. CSOs also will be able to provide the technical support to such a program. In order to implement the 
DRRMN Act, the close collaboration and cooperative framework between governments, CSOs, the private sector, 
and communities needs to be established in the Philippines, and further assistance from the international and 





8.3.2 Planning recovery and implementation: Initial status of “built back better” 
 
The typhoon washed away buildings and the infrastructure of coastal cities mainly by the storm surge, and caused 
tremendous loss and damage to communities along the shore. In response, the Government of the Philippines is 
undertaking rebuilding with an emphasis on “building back better”. As of March 2014, two major national 
rebuilding strategies for land use regulation and community relocations inland are proposed as major national 
rebuilding strategies and aims. This section explains the initial recovery status at 4 months after the typhoon from 
three planning perspectives of: i) on-going coastal land use discussions at the national level, ii) resettlement 
framework and on-going status in localities, and iii) principles for implementing reconstruction. 
 
8.3.2.1 Regulating the use of coastal land: National discussions 
 
In December 2013, the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), a national governmental body 
responsible for coordinating economic and social planning and policy, published a document titled “Reconstruction 
Assistance on Yolanda: Build Back Better (RAY) (National Economic and Development Authority, 2013)”, which 
includes an overview of the typhoon disaster, economic loss, and rebuilding plan that guides basic rebuilding 
procedure. The section on planning for recovery and reconstruction states: “(iii) streamline operational enforcement 
of ‘no build zones’ (National Economic and Development Authority, 2013, p.20).”. Reasons for adopting this 
concept in RAY is not described in the document, however, an idea to strictly control the use of land between the 
coastline and 40 meters inland to prohibit any development was discussed immediately after the typhoon. This 
concept has its root in PD 1067 (Presidential Decree 1067: The Water Code of the Philippines) that governs “the 
ownership, appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, conservation and protection of water resources 
(The government of the Philippines, 1976, p.1)” enacted in 1976.  
Article 51 of this Decree states:  
The banks or rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire 
length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural 
areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of 
public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, float age, fishing and salvage. No person 
shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, 
floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. 
 
This however was not fully addressed in practice prior to the typhoon for two reasons. First, the zone did not have 
clear guidance on ways to interpret coastal lines – whether the zone should be declared as easement from the high 
or low tide marks. Second, there were many informal settlements along the coast that had neglected this Decree. 
With many informal settlements occupying the land along the coast2, local governments could not force existing 
settlements to move out of the easement zone. Because of these reasons, after the disaster the national government 
                                                  




had a strong intention to enforce land use control of the affected coastal areas through rebuilding, by adopting a 
maximum setback width of the easement cited in Article 51, so that future loss and damage from the typhoon will 
be minimized (See messages in Fig.8-23 describing no build zone, constructed at different timing and interpretation 




Fig. 8-23. Different messages in the “no build zone” 
 
After the idea of a 40-meter setback was released, various responses were raised, including negative responses 
claiming that enforcing this land use will disrupt economic activities of coastal communities. With such reasons, 
the national government is currently facing a need to develop a scientific reasoning, which will help lead the 
affected local governments and citizens in understanding and following the setback in rebuilding. The Department 
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) at the 
national level are thus mandated to lead this assessment, by distinguishing between “safe” and “unsafe” zones with 
a modelling exercise that considers inundation and landslide occurrence. In addition, climate change aspects are 
being included, as there are on-going efforts by the Climate Change Commission to mainstream risk reduction 




As debates proceeded in the first four months after the typhoon, the tone on the land use has softened from “no 
building” to “no dwelling”. Although the national government initially sought to have no construction of any 
structure in the 40 meter zone, they have shifted their thoughts to only prohibit residential use in the designated 
zone, as this will be a more practical solution for minimizing future risk. It is important to realize that there has yet 
been no revision regarding the land use of coastal zones after the typhoon, and the legal/regulatory base for the 
coastal land use still relies on PD 1067 of 1976. 
 
8.3.2.2 Resettlement to reduce future risk: Local discussions and current status  
 
General framework for resettlement 
While waiting for a regulatory decision on coastal land use from the national government, the general consensus of 
local governments and communities (Barangays) that were hardly affected by the storm surge is to rebuild in 
locations distant from the coastal areas to extent possible, by adopting relocation programs prepared by the national 
government. By doing so, they are hoping that no one in the region will face such a tragedy in the future. The City 
of Tacloban is planning to put together the typhoon-affected relocating population with other relocating populations 
that already had a plan to be relocated. The project is a part of the “Slum Improvement Resettlement Program (SIR)” 
of the National Housing Authority (NHA)3, for which the City, prior to the typhoon, had begun site construction for 
resettlement in the Eastern Visayas Regional Growth Center (EVRGC) targeting the underprivileged. The EVRGC 
is located in the north of Tacloban City, and has been considered as a growth center of the Leyte region to 
accommodate spillover population of the region and Cebu.  
 
Meanwhile, the Slum Improvement Resettlement Program is identified in the Republic Act No. 7279 (RA 7279): 
Urban Development and Housing Act, which was passed in congress in 1992 to provide a basic urban development 
mechanism for a comprehensive and sustainable urban development and housing. The act particularly emphasizes 
improvement of living environments for underprivileged populations as stated in Section 2: 
(a) Uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas and in 
resettlement areas by making available to them decent housing at affordable cost, basic 
services, and employment opportunities;   
With an intention to merge the on-going resettlement site project funded by the NHA with the relocation of the 
disaster affected population, Tacloban City is currently speeding up site construction for permanent housing in the 
EVRGC area. The construction of these permanent houses is planned to happen through their donation by domestic, 
international, public and private groups and organizations.  
 
                                                  
3 The National Housing Authority belongs to the Office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, and is the 
only national agency that is responsible for providing houses for the unprivileged. It is mandated to provide affordable 
housing with decent and adequate quality, together with needed utilities and facilities as well as with optimum access to 
social services. In Section 3 (p) of the Act, NHA is the mandated as an agency to manage the "Slum Improvement and 
Resettlement Program (SIR)". 
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Ormoc City, on the other hand, is solely targeting the typhoon-affected population to permanently relocate in its 
resettlement scheme. The City is utilizing assistance from the national government and private sectors, but the City 
itself is investing a substantial amount effort for the relocation of affected people. The City has prepared land to use 
for temporary housing, and is also preparing relocation sites for permanent settlements. The City, however, was not 
considering using the “Slum Improvement Resettlement Program” of the NHA in its rebuilding. 
  
In summary, both cities of Tacloban and Ormoc are adopting assistance and programs prepared by the national 
departments and agencies as well as private sector as much as possible, aligning to the strategies stated in 
“Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY)” for better outcomes. One of the key findings here was that a there 
exists a significant difference on how each local government –Tacloban City and Ormoc City – are taking into 
consideration future risks in rebuilding; Tacloban City is seriously considering the 40 meter setback of the “no 
build zone” although it is not yet been decided legally, while Ormoc City is not emphasizing much about 
incorporating this zone in rebuilding, except for existing illegal settlements along the riverbanks. Reasons for this 
are clearly emerging from their different experiences; Tacloban City faced tremendous loss and damage caused by 
the storm surge, while Ormoc City’s loss and damage were mainly from the strong wind4 in this typhoon. In 
addition, Ormoc has an experience of flash flood disaster back in 1991, which caused approximately 5,000 deaths 
and 3,000 missing, making flooding along the river a higher concern than storm surge. On a different note, although 
always challenging under compressed time in recovery, both city governments are investing efforts to reduce the 
stress of the affected population in transition. Some efforts include: putting the temporary housing site and the 
permanent housing site adjacent to each other so that a big move will be unnecessary; and providing additional care 
about space and details about utilities upon setting up the temporary housing.  
 
Status towards resettlement: from evacuation to temporary housing 
When the typhoon was approaching, both city governments shared as much information possible with the 
Barangay leaders for them to disseminate within their communities. By doing so, leaders were hoping that their 
members would be prepared for this largest-ever typhoon in the country’s history. Many Barangay leaders thus 
sought assistance from Barangay officials, namely, Kagawads and Tanolds, for this information dissemination, and 
have done it in various ways. Some Barangays used megaphones while others knocked on individual doors to 
persuade the households to evacuate to the designated evacuation centers. The majority of the evacuation centers 
included elementary schools, Barangay offices, and other available public facilities. Some individuals evacuated to 
hotels considering that the structure of such buildings are more durable than private homes.  
 
Following this initial evacuation, in the next month, affected populations begun moving back to the original site. 
They have begun constructing houses “temporarily” in the hope of finding more resilient sites, with less disaster 
risks, for permanent homes. Government had prepared temporary shelters in both cities around the time of this field 
reconnaissance, and least-privileged of the affected population were beginning to move in. Both cities were 
                                                  
4 Damage caused by typhoon Haiyan in Ormoc City was also devastating. Number of death was 38, population 
displaced reached 97 percent of the total households (total households: 43,729), and 96 percent (or 42,303) houses were 
somehow damaged (totally damaged houses: 73 percent (or 31,921); partially damaged houses: 23 percent (or 10,382)).  
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mandated to prepare lands for this temporary use, and the temporary shelters, often locally called bunkhouses, were 
being provided by the national government. The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) is 
responsible for constructing the bunkhouses, which are then turned over to the Department of Social Welfare and 
Development (DSWD) for distribution to beneficiaries. In total, DPWH has allocated 142 bunkhouse units5 as of 
December 2013, which will accommodate some 3,336 families affected by the typhoon. Targeted regions for the 
provision include: Tacloban City; Palo, Leyte; Ormoc City; Basey, Samar; and Eastern Samar (DPWH, 2013). In 
mid-February, approximately 1,500 people had already moved into 60 bunkhouses prepared in the Eastern Visayas, 
to Tacloban City (222 families); Palo, Layte (429 families); Ormoc City (429 families); Basey and Samar (222 
families); and Eastern Samar (673 families) (The government of the Philippines, 2014). The use of bunkhouses in 
the resettlement phase differed between Tacloban City and Ormoc City. Tacloban City has positioned this 
bunkhouse to function more as temporary shelters, aiming to house the vulnerable population – those having 
disabilities and financially disadvantaged – for limited period of time6 prior to their permanent settlement. On the 
other hand, Ormoc City is using these bunkhouses as a temporary housing for people to live for a certain amount of 
time before moving into permanent homes. Thus, they prefer calling them “transitional shelter (houses)” rather than 
bunkhouses. During this time of field reconnaissance, other types of temporary houses were being prepared by 
donors, including international and domestic NGOs as well as the private sector.  
 
 
Fig. 8-24. Bunkhouses in Tacoban City (left) and Ormoc City (Right). 
 
Tacloban City’s challenge to rebuild back better 
Plan for permanent settlement of the disaster affected population 
The majority of public assistance targeted the most disadvantaged in the initial stage of rebuilding, often the 
informal settlers, as was also the case in Tacloban City. According the information office of the City, the number of 
families in informal settlements prior to the typhoon accounted for more than 30,000, 2,142 of which were still 
                                                  
5 Each bunkhouse was initially designed to comprise approximately 24 units of dwellings, later modified to 12 units due 
to small size of each unit. Initially, a family with 3 to 4 members were planned to occupy 1 unit, where a unit has an area 
of 8.64 square meters.  
6 Their original intention was to use the bunkhouses for maximum of six months. 
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living in evacuation centers as of mid-March, 2014. Their building damage was so severe that totally damaged 
buildings exceeded 29,000 and partially damaged buildings accounted for more than 18,000. Among the totally 
damaged houses, about 14,400 houses were built in prospective no-dwelling zones.  
 
In rebuilding, therefore, 20,000 permanent housing units are planned to be constructed in the EVRGC site north of 
Tacloban City. The rationale of this number comes from the number of informal settlement units in different 
locations. According to the city building office, the total number of informal settlement units adds up to 30,513 (see 
Table 8-1). Units to be targeted for relocation will be 20,000 in total, with a breakdown of 14,433 units identified in 
the prospective no dwelling zone and about 5,500 units built in the zone identified as dangerous and in river basin 
beside subdivisions.  
 
Table 8-1. Breakdown of informal settlements in Tacloban City by location type. 
No dwelling zone (along coastal zone)* 14,433
Subdivision 16,080 
Danger zone/ River basin* 5,567 
Other areas 10,513 
Total 30,513 
 
Nevertheless, the City’s short- and mid-term plan is to construct 10,000 rather than 20,000 units. The reason for this 
is because the city could only prepare lands that could accommodate this number of units; as of March 2014, the 
City has 92 hectares in total7 for developing of which 85 hectares are prepared by the City and 7 hectares are 
donated by the Archdiocese of Palo. As for the construction schedule, the city is planning to develop 4,000 
permanent housing units in 2014, and additional 4,000 units in 2015, continuing until the number reaches 10,000.  
 
System of transitional phase toward permanent settlement 
In Tacloban City, the governmental scheme towards permanent resettlement has three phases: emergency 
sheltering/temporary sheltering; temporary housing; and permanent housing. The first, emergency 
sheltering/temporary sheltering phase is the time when the typhoon affected population is seeking to evacuate and 
temporary stay in a place away from home. Most of the typhoon-affected population is currently in this phase, 
although there are two distinctive locations where people could be. One is the evacuation center, represented by 
schools, Astrodome and the tent city where majority of the population who have not yet decided to rebuild in their 
original place reside. The other is the bunkhouses provided by the DPWH through DSWD of the national 
government. This is currently located in the city center, in Barangays Abucay (8 bunkhouses), Motocross (27 
bunkhouses), and NHA (17 bunkhouses). The goal of this bunkhouse use for the first batch of residents to move 
into temporary housing within six months. These population then will move out of temporary housing and into 
permanent houses when these are ready. By doing so, the second group of typhoon affected population can move 
into this bunkhouses six months later, and live for certain periods of time until the temporary housing becomes 
ready to move in. The City is planning to create such revolving system so that disaster affected population can 
                                                  
7 This includes 10 hectares of land that has already been developed with NHA’s resettlement program 
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benefit from the bunkhouses.  
 
The second in the “temporary housing” phase, where aspects of livelihoods are being reestablished, although the 
stay in such locations is not considered permanent. All temporary houses will be created in the north of Tacloban 
City, in EVRGC so that there will be no need to be displaced again into permanent homes for the resettling families. 
Transitional houses are currently being provided by various types of donors (See Fig.8-25 for an example of 
transnational shelters).  
  
Fig. 8-25. Transnational Housing in Eastern Visayas Regional Growth Center (EVRGC). 
 
Lastly, the “permanent housing” is a phase when the typhoon affected population is settling into permanent houses. 
Currently, land development is on-going in an area which can accommodate 500 housing units (See Fig.8-6). As 
mentioned, the national government, including the NHA’s program, could only fund land development but not the 
individual housing units, thus, various partners and donors have pledged to donate 10,161 units of houses for the 
permanent relocation sites (See Table 8-2).  
 
 






Table 8-2. Donor Pledges for houses and community facilities for permanent relocation sites. 
Partner/Donor Pledge Area/Location 
Philippines Red Cross 5,000 units New Kawayan 
GMA Foundation 400 units Sto. Nino 
Habitat for Humanity 852 units Sto. Nino 
SOS Children's Village Tacloban, Inc. 254 units Palanogl 2 
Zonta 20 units Tacloban North 
Kimse Yokmu 30 units Tacloban North 
DSWD 134 units undecided 
Habitat 2,500 units undecided 
Lions Club International 50 units undecided 
Philippines Institute of Civil Engineers 50 units undecided 
Unknown 871 units unknown 
Total 10,161 units   
Source: Tacloban City Information Office 
 
Reflection 
In parallel to all on-going efforts regarding construction of temporary and permanent housings, together with other 
non-construction efforts, the city government is currently crafting a master plan of the city. The initial master plan 
was to be finalized by the end of March 2014. Because there is no final official decision by the national government 
on ways to consider the prospective no-dwelling zones yet, planning efforts are stagnant with a fear of local 
governments making decisions conflicting with the national decision. Nevertheless, the city mayor is supporting the 
idea of relocating the coastal communities inland, especially the communities of the Barangay 88, where damage 
and loss from the storm surge were most destructive. At the same time, all Barangay leaders interviewed in the 
focus group agreed that all of their members are willing to relocate to safer locations to avoid future storm surge 
risks. Nevertheless, with limited resources available to accommodate the relocation of individuals seeking to 
relocate inland, many have temporarily given up on an immediate solution of this issue, and has begun to return to 
their original land for “temporary” living (Fig.8-27). 
 




8.3.2.3 Principles for implementing reconstruction  
 
Reconstruction principles 
The “Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Build back better (RAY)” by the National Economic and Development 
Authority has set the stage to implement reconstruction of the typhoon affected regions. There are three principles 
in this recovery. First, the need of efficient coordination is called for, which combines strong central coordination 
and flexible implementation at the local level. At the same time, local governments are mandated for the 
responsibility of implementing reconstruction. Second, inclusiveness and sustainable livelihoods are underscored in 
the reconstruction processes, in order to address pre-existing poverty issues in the region. Finally, the third principle 
includes the need to incorporate gender perspectives in reconstruction, as a starting point is already different 
between males and females in reconstruction, and thus, empowerment of women in the rebuilding processes is 
needed for a more equitable society in the future. 
 
There are two other key aspects in this 
reconstruction strategy. First is the partnership 
with the private sector. The national government 
is pushing further for a partnership with the 
private sector upon implementing this RAY, 
beyond emergency relief and response that has 
been implemented successfully. As part of 
evidence for this strategy being effective, some 
private foundations have already pledged to 
donate permanent houses for relocation sites to 
be developed by the government. Second is the 
institutional arrangement for implementing this 
reconstruction strategy, that the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (PARR) is 
designated as the coordinating body for implementing RAY. The PARR was appointed by President Benigno S. 
Aquino III in memorandum order No. 62 of December 6, 2013, to integrate efforts of all governments and agencies 
that are involved in this reconstruction as a manager and a coordinator. Their responsibility includes consultation 
with local governments in formulating recovery plans and programs that are required to submit the President, 
develop funding support for local implementation of the plans and programs, and oversee overall coordination 
between national agencies and departments as well as various non-governmental, private, and any entities engaged 
in rebuilding. The office has been set up since early January of 2014 in Bonifacio City of Taguig City, where 
Secretary Panfilo Lacson has been elected to be the head and rehabilitation czar. The duration of this office is 
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